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FROM KABILA TO KABILA
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE CONGO
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Joseph Kabila, son of the late Laurent Désiré Kabila, speaks a far more peaceful
language than that of his bellicose father. But he will not be able to deliver peace alone,
and there are already signs that the many parties to the war in the Democratic Republic
of Congo are heading for renewed confrontation. In a Congo that continues to fragment,
Kabila’s patrons and his enemies are beginning to quarrel among themselves. What
looms are a series of battles as the factions struggle for influence and spoils.
The assassination of Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001 and the appointment of his son
Joseph as President of the DRC brought fresh hope to the stalled Lusaka Peace process.
The new president swiftly agreed to the deployment of a United Nations military
observer force (MONUC) to oversee troop withdrawals, and he approved the
appointment of Sir Ketumile Masire to open a vital Inter-Congolese Dialogue. There has
also been contact between Kabila and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, his father’s old
enemy, on disarmament of the forces associated with the Rwandan genocide of 1994,
who found refuge in Congo. The UN Security Council hailed these gestures of goodwill
by approving the deployment of MONUC in February to verify disengagement of forces,
and almost immediately Rwandan and Ugandan forces began some troop withdrawals.
But these positive steps on disarmament and disengagement are being undermined by
the ongoing political struggle for influence and access to resources, which will make the
Inter-Congolese Dialogue a very difficult exercise.  It is still not clear how strong Joseph
Kabila’s true commitment to the peace process is, nor the extent of his real influence
over the DRC’s ruling elite. Kabila’s nominal allies, Angola and Zimbabwe, deeply
mistrustful of each other, are trying to push their own interests through Congolese
proxies. Zimbabwe, suspicious of the security breach that enabled Laurent Kabila to be
killed, has detained numerous Congolese associated with Angola, including Eddy Kapend,
the military officer who appeared on television shortly after the assassination calling for
calm.
The rifts between former allies are not confined to the pro-Kabila side. Rwanda and
Uganda, once united against Laurent Kabila, are showing further signs that their
relationship has frayed. President Yoweri Museveni recently called Rwanda a “hostile
state,” accusing it of giving financial support to his domestic political opponents during
the recent elections. In turn, Rwanda has accused Uganda of harbouring some of
President Kagame’s opponents.
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In Kinshasa, hardliners are back in control of the government, opposing any dialogue
with anti-government rebels until there is a total military withdrawal of all foreign forces.
The rebels, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, refuse any dialogue without a power-
sharing agreement. Frustrated by the lack of progress, the powerful Ugandan-backed
rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba has already threatened to reopen fighting. There
appears, therefore, to be long odds against the Inter-Congolese Dialogue ever starting.
If it does begin, it is likely to become a new theatre for strife between all the competing
interests.
The success of the Lusaka process is critical for lasting peace in Congo and all of Central
Africa. This giant land is a state in name only. Its structures are destroyed and regions
fragmented between enemies and friends. It urgently needs a power-sharing agreement
that includes unarmed opposition groups and rebel representatives as well as pro-Kabila
factions. It needs a government of transition and a new constitution. None can be
achieved without vigilance and support from all parties involved and the international
community.
Strict conditions over assistance to Joseph Kabila must be enforced to overcome the
political resistance to an Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Failure to act will mean a resumption
of hostilities, a war of succession and further fragmentation of the country into semi-
permanent spheres of military influence and the certainty of worse crises to come.
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
A. On Disengagement
1. Maintain pressure on the belligerents to disengage their forces under the terms of the
Kampala and Harare Disengagement Plans.
2. Maintain pressure on Rwanda and Uganda on the one hand, and Angola and
Zimbabwe on the other, to negotiate in good faith on complete withdrawal of their
forces from the DRC. Such pressure can be maintained through reassessments of
their qualifications to receive military and financial aid, debt relief and trade
privileges.
B. On Dialogue
3. Give provisional support, including the progressive resumption of development aid, to
Joseph Kabila’s regime on condition that: 1) he liberalises political activities and frees
political prisoners; 2) he guarantees freedom of movement to all participants to the
Inter-Congolese Dialogue as well as a peaceful working environment for Ketumile
Masire’s team in Kinshasa; 3) he agrees to participate in the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue as outlined in the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement by supporting its preliminary
and preparatory steps and consistently supporting Masire's activities.
4. Pressure the new government to immediately cease the repression of Kivutians and
Equatorians on the territory it controls.
5. Pressure Rwanda and Uganda to have the RCD and FLC respect freedom of
association in the territory they control and guarantee political party and civil society
representatives' freedom of movement to meet Ketumile Masire’s team.
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6. Pressure Rwanda and Uganda to respect International Humanitarian Law in the
Eastern DRC and to have the RCD and FLC arrest human rights abusers within their
ranks and discipline them severely.
C. On Disarmament
7. Pressure the new government and its allies to immediately cease support of the ex-
FAR and FDD factions and to encourage the FDD to join the Burundi peace process.
8. Direct the UN Observer Mission, MONUC, to commence planning for a comprehensive
disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement, and reintegration (DDRR) process of
armed groups in the eastern DRC.
9. Implement UN Security Council Resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995), 1011 (1995),
and 1341 (2001), as well as the recommendations of the report of the UN
Commission of Enquiry on Rwanda (1997), which together provide a legal basis for
the resumption of an arms embargo against the ex-FAR.
TO THE SIGNATORIES OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT
10. Immediately stop supporting the "negative forces" and co-operate as quickly as
possible with MONUC in order to assess the needs for a major DDRR exercise.
11. Comply with the Kampala and Harare disengagement plan and start withdrawing
from DRC.
12. Help the Inter-Congolese Dialogue by identifying the key interests to be negotiated in
order to have a stable government emerge.
Nairobi/Brussels, 16 March 2001
FROM KABILA TO KABILA
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE CONGO
I. INTRODUCTION
Eighteen months of deadlock in efforts to end the war in the Congo came to a
sudden end with the assassination of President Laurent Désiré Kabila on 16 January
2001. The late leader had been compelled to sign what he came to see as an
unfavourable cease-fire agreement in the Zambian capital of Lusaka in July 1999,
and had since obstructed implementation of its every term.1 His replacement by his
29-year old son Joseph consequently gave new hope to the peace process.
The international community seized the opportunity afforded by the late president’s
murder and re-engaged in the DRC. Leaders in the U.S., Europe, and the United
Nations immediately recognised the new president in order to give him the
confidence to break from the policies of his father and implement the terms of the
Lusaka cease-fire. In return, Joseph Kabila agreed to join an Inter-Congolese
Dialogue facilitated by the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, and
welcomed a quick deployment of MONUC, the UN military observer mission for the
Congo. The UN Security Council responded to these gestures with the passage of
Resolution 1341 on 22 February 2001.
Yet no matter how hopeful the signs, peace in the Congo still remains to be
achieved. The interests of the foreign belligerents and their Congolese allies do not
favour the creation of a strong, independent and democratic state. In Kinshasa a
dangerous contest to become Joseph Kabila’s foremost foreign patron has sprung
up between Angola and Zimbabwe. Similarly, in the east, tensions persist between
different rebel groups and their competing Rwandan and Ugandan sponsors.  None
of these “strongman” governments are enthusiastic about an Inter-Congolese
Dialogue or creation of a transition government built around the principles of power
sharing. The late president’s obstructionist policies had largely obscured these
contradictions. Now that he is gone, they are certain to come to the fore.
The task of reconstruction, moreover, is daunting. After two regional wars, and 34
years of mismanagement, little remains of the Congolese state.  Outside major
towns and away from strategic locations, there is little or no government presence.
Foreign armies and their mining operations control much of the country’s legendary
wealth, while rapacious militias and insurgent armies prey upon vast swathes of its
                                        
1 For a comprehensive analysis of the war since the signature of the Lusaka Cease-fire
Agreement see ICG Africa Report no. 26, Scramble for the Congo. Anatomy of an Ugly War,
Nairobi/Brussels, 20 December 2000.
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territory. In sum, the de facto disappearance of the DRC as a nation state is well
underway.
A Joseph Kabila who is under the thumb of his foreign allies and the barons of his
father’s regime cannot reverse the country’s decline. The same holds true for any
other  leader who might emerge from the rebellion or from within the present
regime. What the country requires instead is an institutional rebirth, delivered
through a Congolese Dialogue and a transition government with a mandate to
organise rapid elections. This can only come about with regional co-operation and
world engagement. Similarly the international community must overcome its
frustration and lack of interest in Africa and live up to its calls for peace.
II. NEW PLANS FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARMAMENT: A DIFFICULT
ROAD AHEAD
The achievements of the 15 February 2001 regional summit on DRC in Lusaka and
the 21/22 February Security Council meeting have revived hopes for a rebirth of the
long-stalled peace process. The summit parties committed themselves to implement
the Kampala and Harare plans for disengagement of forces, signed in April and
December 2000.2 In addition, Joseph Kabila accepted the former president of
Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire as the facilitator for the Inter-Congolese dialogue.
The recent appointment of Brigadier General Njuki Mwanyiki of Kenya as the new
Joint Military Commission (JMC) Chairman, as well as promises of UN cash, have
revived the previously moribund organisation, which will soon be moved to
Kinshasa.3
Then on 22 February 2001 the United Nation’s Security Council returned its
attention to the Congo by passing Resolution 1341, which again demanded the
withdrawal of foreign forces and urged the parties to the Lusaka Cease-fire
Agreement to adopt a ‘precise plan and schedule’ by 15 May 2001. The Council
demanded that the parties abide in the interim by their promises and start carrying
out the Kampala and Harare disengagement plans on 15 March 2001. It also
adopted a new Concept of Operations for MONUC, and confirmed its commitment
to disarming the ‘negative forces’.4
                                        
2 The Kampala Plan, and Harare Sub-plan provide the operational details for the disengagement
of belligerent forces. In phase one the parties will withdraw their forces 15 km from the
Confrontation Line. In phase two they will concentrate their forces in Defensive Positions
beyond the borders of the Demilitarised Zone for MONUC and JMC verification.
3 The JMC, made up of representatives of each signatory to the Lusaka Agreement was
intended to plan, monitor and provide liaison for the cease-fire, disengagement and
disarmament processes. It will now be co-located within MONUC HQ but is yet to function
properly.
4 ‘Concept of Operations’ is a doctrinal military term used to refer to the broad outline of how a
commander intends to accomplish his mission. A change in the Concept of Operations does not
imply a change in the mission. ‘Negative forces’ is a term used in the Lusaka Agreement to
describe armed groups other than government forces operating from the territory of the DRC.
They include FAR, ADF, LRA, UNRF II, NALU, Interahamwe militias, FUNA, FDD, WNBF, UNITA
and others.
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A. Resolution 1341: The Return of the French
The Security Council resolution was a victory for the French diplomats who wrote it.
Since the beginning of the war in August 1998, Paris has always been concerned to
prevent the de facto partition of the DRC, the second largest francophone country
in the world. It has condemned the Rwandan and Ugandan invasion of the Congo
as akin to the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in spite of his foibles, it recognised
Laurent Kabila as the legitimate national leader of his country.5 After the Congolese
president was compelled to sign the Lusaka cease-fire that was meant to bring
about his fall from power, France continued to buttress his regime. Its worst enemy
in this effort, it often seemed, was the erratic character of the late Congolese
president himself, who consistently lived up to his poor reputation. The accession of
his apparently more reasonable son, combined with U.S. acquiescence, permitted
France to lead the new international effort.
French diplomacy began to capitalise on the mistakes of the Rwandan and Ugandan
invaders last summer.  After six days of fighting between their armies in the north-
eastern city of Kisangani in June 2000 during which some 700 civilians perished,
France orchestrated a Security Council condemnation (Resolution 1304). It called
for immediate withdrawal of Rwandan and Uganda forces and noted with concern
the continuing illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources. The same post-
Kisangani displeasure with Rwanda and Uganda is echoed in Resolution 1341.
Alone among the belligerents in the DRC, the two are singled out by name in the
Council’s demand for a withdrawal of foreign forces.  In addition, the Council
expressed support for the expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural
resources, set up by resolution 1304, and affirmed that it was willing to put an end
to these practices. The resolution also kept alive the prospect of deploying UN
peace-keepers to the eastern borders of the DRC.  Paris and Kinshasa have long
argued that this would hinder the de facto partition of the country. Finally, the
Council reaffirmed interest in the long-time project of French President Jacques
Chirac for an international conference on peace, security, democracy, and
development in the Great Lakes region. This proposal displeases Kigali and
Kampala, who fear being outnumbered by Francophone Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon,
and the Central African Republic, as well as Kabila’s SADC allies. They argue this
venue would not produce solutions for the Congo’s reconstruction and the
disarmament of armed groups.6
In spite of its criticism, Rwanda is not unhappy with Resolution 1341, which could
have been much tougher. Paris’ recognition of the need to disarm the ex Forces
Armées Rwandaises (ex FAR) and Interahamwe militias7, and its call for an end to
state support for these forces, reveals that it no longer systematically rejects the
security arguments Rwanda uses to justify its presence in the Congo. The
document makes no mention of sanctions against Kigali.
In order to bring about this rapprochement with France, Kigali seems to have
accepted Paris’ unwillingness to repent for its role in the 1994 genocide.8 This
change of heart is due in part to France’s readiness to forego efforts to undermine
                                        
5 ICG Interview, French Foreign Ministry official, Paris, 5 January 2001.
6 ICG interview, Rwanda security official, Kigali, 17 January 2001.
7 Ex-FAR and Interahamwe are the forces that carried out the Rwandan genocide in 1994.
8 Kigali’s intention to re-open its Paris embassy is additional evidence of this warming of
relations between the two countries.
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Rwanda in multilateral organisations, as well as Kigali’s fear of an electoral defeat
for the Labour government in the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Blair, like U.S.
President Clinton, always strongly supported the Kagame regime.  Were he to be
upset in the election anticipated later this year and relations with France to remain
poor, Kigali would be dangerously exposed in the Security Council, and European
Union councils.9
France’s primary interest is to protect its oil-producing friends (Congo-Brazzaville,
Gabon, Angola), and to reassure its Francophone African clients that Paris will
stand behind them if their regimes are threatened.  Since its reduced military
presence on the ground calls into question its Cold War defence agreements with
African countries, Paris must demonstrate that it can still win diplomatic battles.
Resolution 1341 therefore marks the return of Paris to the forefront of Great Lakes
diplomacy.
The French diplomatic activity comes as a relief to other permanent members of
the Security Council, who hope to limit their own involvement in the Congolese
imbroglio. The new U.S. President George W. Bush is showing no signs of engaging
significantly in the continent’s issues.  Belgium, long one of the most active
Western countries in the Congo, has limited resources and needs to build alliances
for its turn as EU President in the second half of 2001.10
So far, the French diplomatic comeback has served the interests of the DRC
government. However the free hand given to Paris does not bode well for the
Congolese people if it permits France to continue its past unquestioning support for
the Mobutu and then Kabila regimes.
B. Less is Better: MONUC’s New Concept of Operations
The long stalled MONUC has started deploying following passage of Resolution
1341. This hopeful development results in part from the political thaw that
accompanied Joseph Kabila’s rise to power. At the same time, it is the consequence
of serious rethinking within the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) on how to accomplish its mission more effectively.
The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement originally called upon the UN to deploy an
appropriate peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII mandate. The force’s
expected role was to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign
forces, to collect and account for weapons held by civilians, and to provide
humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict. The  mission also
included peace enforcement. UN troops were to track down and disarm non-
signatory forces, screen them for mass killers and other war criminals, and hand
over suspected ‘génocidaires’ to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
The enormity of the task of deploying a peacekeeping force to the DRC whatever
its mandate was clear from the outset. Security Council officials in New York were
loath to accept responsibility for what they expected to be a disaster. The U.S.
Congress, which contributes one-third of any peacekeeping operation’s budget,
was equally wary of what appeared to be a dangerous Congolese quagmire.
                                        
9 Interview, French Diplomat, Kigali, 24 January 2001, and Rwandan diplomats, Kigali,
Washington, February 2001.
10 ICG interviews, Belgian Foreign Ministry and EU officials, Brussels, February 2001.
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Compelled to placate these conflicting concerns, the UN Secretary General decreed
that the force deployed to the Congo must be both militarily credible and cheap.
Armed with this guidance DPKO planners designed a Concept of Operations for
MONUC, which was adopted on 24 February 2000 by the Security Council
(Resolution 1291). In addition to 500 observers and support units, the UN would
deploy four mechanised infantry battalions. This force was to establish four strong
points in the DRC to which, in the event of trouble, the observers could retreat.
The total mission would number 5,537 soldiers.
Over the next year the shortcomings of this plan became clear. The immediate task
of the observers was to verify and monitor the disengagement of belligerents. The
concept of operations implied, however, that this would have to wait for the
deployment of the infantry battalions, which was expected to take at least six
months. Moreover, planners could expect additional delays due to the uncertain
availability and preparedness of units the member states had pledged. Finally, it
was never clear what purpose these armed forces would serve once deployed.11
From the outset, pundits ridiculed the notion that a four-battalion strong MONUC
was militarily credible or even capable of defending itself. UN officials agreed that
only a massive force could realistically bring a semblance of security to the country.
Anything less, they worried, would encourage false expectations among the
Congolese that would probably lead to another humiliating peacekeeping failure.
While the revised Concept of Operations is a substantial improvement12, it leaves
some questions unanswered. Planners have once again side stepped how to disarm
groups such as the Interahamwe in the hope that the belligerents reach a political
consensus. UN officials now think ‘the only solution to disarmament is co-operation
between the government of Rwanda and the government of DRC’.13
Prior to Laurent Kabila’s death, DPKO began to revise its concept of operations for
the Congo. Its motivation was above all the logistical difficulties involved in
equipping and deploying the four infantry battalions.14 Planners were also afraid
that the UN would be unprepared to seize the moment if the belligerents suddenly
agreed to begin disengagement.15 In fact, this had occurred after the signing of the
8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan, when a lack of funds for leasing aircraft
prevented the immediate deployment of observers.16
Under the new operations plan, the re-tooled force is tailored to accomplish the
limited mission of verifying and monitoring the disengagement of conventional
forces. This is an achievable objective if the belligerents co-operate. The document
identifies other likely missions such as the disarmament of armed groups and the
reconstruction of the Congolese Army, but delays these tasks until a later stage.
                                        
11 ICG Telephone interview with a senior MONUC commander, Kinshasa, 19 February 2001.
12 The new plan is consistent with ICG's recommendations in ICG Africa Report N° 26, The
Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, 20 December 2000, cited in footnote 1.
13 Interview, DPKO officials, New York, 24 February 2001. For a full assessment of MONUC’s
mandate and first Concept of Operation see ICG Africa Report N° 26, The Scramble for the
Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, op cit.
14 The dilapidated state of DRC airfields, roads, and urban infrastructure presented MONUC
logisticians with enormous obstacles to overcome. For example to deploy a single battalion to
Kisangani was expected to take 75 days. ICG Interviews, MONUC logistical officers, Kisangani,
August 2000; ICG Telephone interview with a senior MONUC commander, Kinshasa, 19
February 2001; See, Scramble for the Congo, op cit, p. 75.
15 ICG Interview with MONUC official, Goma, 13 February 2001.
16 ICG Interview, former senior MONUC commander, London, 10 January 2001.
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The revised plan foresees deployment of approximately 2,500 personnel and
decreases armed troops from 3,400 to 1,900. Based on the understanding that the
primary threat facing the UN forces is theft or sabotage rather than armed attack,
planners have decided to deploy ‘guard and security companies’ to protect MONUC
equipment and installations, instead of the logistically burdensome mechanised
battalions. These armed troops will not be capable of rescuing at risk observers
however, as was foreseen in the original concept of operations. Commanders must
therefore remain vigilant to threats faced by the observers and be ready to
withdraw them from regions where they might be at risk. The force is also to be
augmented by additional command and control, aviation, logistical, and medical
capabilities.
The latest changes to MONUC are also calculated to serve political agendas. Early
discussions of what should be done included the notion of establishing a
permanent mechanism to monitor the cease-fire to be collocated with the JMC in
Kisangani. French influence, and the new-found respectability of the Kinshasa
regime has led the Security Council to consent to relocate the JMC in the
Congolese capital as originally planned, instead of the rebel controlled but largely
demilitarised Kisangani.17
When presented with the new plan, regional countries complained that the force
was too small and revealed international double standards when dealing with
African crises.  For example, Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge noted
with concern that the plan was a ‘step-by-step gradualist and minimalist concept of
operations’ and ‘conveyed an impression of hesitancy and doubt’.18 In response,
officials at the UN rightly argue that the new force will be able to concentrate on its
mission of verifying and monitoring the disengagement better since it will not be
burdened by the infantry battalions. The smaller footprint, moreover, will counter
unrealistic expectations of the Congolese and other belligerents concerning the real
capabilities of the UN force to bring peace.19
C. The MONUC Disengagement Operation
Security Council resolution 1341 demands that the belligerents implement the
Harare Disengagement Plan over four periods of two weeks each starting 15 March
2001. The process of verification by MONUC will begin on 29 March in the Southern
Katanga region. Observers will gradually work their way northwards, spending two
weeks in each of the four areas defined by the Kampala Plan. Once they have
finished verifying compliance in one area, they will leave in place a smaller
monitoring force and shift their efforts to the next. At the conclusion of the 56-day
process, MONUC will field a force capable of observing the entire conventional front
line.
The elimination of the security battalions will permit MONUC to focus on the
essential – but still substantial - tasks required for the force to conduct its
verification and monitoring mission.20 Additional observers, vehicles of all types,
and aviation assets must be deployed to the theatre. In addition, the security
                                        
17  United Nations. ‘Permanent Mechanism’. Mimeo, DPKO, 4 January 2001.
18 Press release, SC 7015, 21 February 2001.
19 ICG Telephone interview with a senior MONUC commander, Kinshasa, 19 February 2001.
20 ICG Interview with MONUC official, Goma, 13 February 2001.
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companies must be deployed to protect high value equipment and supplies. To
accommodate this influx of personnel and equipment, MONUC must prepare
buildings, create logistical depots, establish field hospitals, and set up redundant
communication networks for its newly established Mbandaka, Kisangani, Kananga,
and Kalemie Sector Headquarters. The requirements of the aviation intensive
operation will also necessitate the creation of a robust air operations command
structure and adequate ground support capabilities in all these locations.
After the completion of the initial verification phase, 376 officers divided into 94
military observation (MILOBS) teams will conduct continuous monitoring
operations. To ease co-ordination between the MILOBS and the belligerent forces,
DPKO expects to create additional small co-ordination centres, located possibly at
Basankusu, Boende, Lusambo, and Pweto. There may also be a need to reinforce
the MONUC Headquarters staff in Kinshasa and the Military Liaison Offices (MLO) in
the belligerents’ capitals.21
Where possible, observers will conduct their duties from vehicles. In cases where
there are no usable roads or airstrips, observers will be deployed by helicopter,
then move on foot. MONUC also intends to use the more than 14,000 KM of
navigable waterways in the DRC to move supplies, observers, and demonstrate a
UN presence. Where possible, local craft will be used but the force also intends to
deploy military patrol vessels.
Finally, MONUC intends to put in place an information operation to deliver the
MONUC perspective to the Congolese and respond in a timely manner to erroneous
statements made by the belligerents. In addition, the force means to become the
official source for public and international information concerning the
disengagement process.
The parties have demanded some modifications to the Harare Plan that will make
MONUC’s task more difficult.22 The most important of these concerns involves the
increase of cantonment points from 38 to 70 sites, which will increase the number
of locations for observers to monitor. Over time, however, MONUC expects that the
logistical difficulties inherent in supporting dispersed locations will convince the
belligerent forces to consolidate their positions.  Other problems concern the status
of Pweto and Ikela, key logistical nodes to which opposing forces are demanding
access.23 MONUC is willing to monitor activities in these towns but not to assume
complete control. Negotiations to resolve these questions are underway in the
JMC.23
Once the initial disengagement process is over, the UN hopes to move towards a
full withdrawal of the belligerent forces from the DRC. Resolution 1341 urged the
parties to the Lusaka Agreement ‘to prepare and adopt not later than 15 May 2001,
in close liaison with MONUC, a precise plan and schedule which would lead to the
completion of the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops’ from the country. In
addition, the resolution calls upon the Secretary General to provide the Security
Council with a report on the progress of these efforts by 15 April.
                                        
21 Ibid.
22 ICG Interview, Senior MONUC Commander, Kinshasa, 7 March 2001.
23 On Pweto, see further below.
23 ICG Interview, Senior MONUC Commander, Kinshasa, 7 March 2001.
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The symbolic gestures from the parties that this diplomatic pressure for withdrawal
seems to have provoked does not yet indicate real progress.  For example when
Rwanda pulled out of Pweto, the town remained under the control of
Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) - Goma forces, which are
widely suspected of including RPA soldiers.24 Likewise, its offer to pull back 200
KM, to the easily defendable line of the upper Congo River has always been a
device to gain the diplomatic upper hand while not surrendering any military
advantage. The same holds true for Uganda’s current withdrawal of 1,500 troops
from Buta and Beni, which observers in Kampala interpret as either a security
measure or a political gesture from President Yoweri Museveni on the eve of the 12
March presidential elections.
The Kinshasa government’s allies are also reluctant to leave the DRC.  Zimbabwean
President Robert Mugabe told Belgian officials on his official visit to Brussels on
March 7 that Zimbabwean National Defence Forces (ZNDF) would not pull back as
long as the Kinshasa government was militarily threatened.25 The Angolans are also
nervous that a premature departure of their forces from the Congo would result in
a vacuum that could be filled by a pro-UNITA government.
Fears of post-withdrawal chaos are not entirely  unreasonable as the recent
upsurge of fighting in South Kivu makes clear. The pullout of foreign forces would
leave in place a variety of armed non-signatory groups who, in the case of the
Rwandan and Burundian insurgent movements, are intent on violently subverting
the regimes presently in power in Kigali and Bujumbura. The behaviour of the
foreign forces however, is often the cause of much of the turmoil in the country.
The Mai Mai uprising in South Kivu is partly a reaction to the Rwandan occupation.
Similarly, the inept Ugandan pacification measures in the north-eastern province of
Ituri and the willingness of Ugandan officers to takes sides for money have
provoked repeated outbursts of ethnic fighting, and risks becoming a full blown
insurgency aimed at the Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF).
Ultimately, without a political consensus among the belligerents, there is little that
MONUC can do to bring about a withdrawal of the foreign forces. The international
community will not, and should not, send large numbers of peace-keepers to the
Congo. Nevertheless, the relative stability of much of Equateur Province, controlled
by Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
(MLC), and the government-controlled territories demonstrates that there is in fact
little need for foreign troops whether they are peace-keepers or armed belligerents.
Instead what is required is a serious international commitment to disarm the so-
called ‘negative forces’ in the eastern Kivus region whose presence justifies the
foreign occupation.
                                        
24 On 4 December 2000 RPA and RCD-Goma forces seized the town of Pweto, which under the
8 April Kampala Disengagement Plan was to have remained in the hands of the FAC and allied
forces. Subsequently, on 2 March the RPA troops carried out a well-publicised 200 km
withdrawal from the town that was meant to signal Kigali’s desire for peace. RCD-Goma troops
however, remained in place in the town. To secure their pull-back as well, in accordance with
the Disengagement Plan, the Kinshasa government was compelled to agree to an effective
amendment of the original plan’s Confrontation Line, from which the belligerent forces are to
pull back 15 km. Negotiations to resolve these matters were underway in the JMC, when on 7
March the government accused the RPA of having withdrawn only 10 km from the town. See
‘DR Congo says Rwandan Pullback from Pweto Incomplete – Criticises UN “Lethargy”’, RTNC
TV, Kinshasa, in French 1230 GMT 6 March 2001. As monitored by the BBC.
25 ‘Mugabe Faces European Critics, Avoids Arrest’, Reuters, Brussels, 5 March 2001.
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D. Disarmament: At Last, a Plan of Action?
The new Concept of Operations also envisages a future requirement to disarm
groups like the Interahamwe. DPKO planners have delayed this unpleasant
assignment in the hope that the evolution of the political situation will make it
somehow easier to think about. Resolution 1341 in fact ‘urges all the parties to the
conflict, in close liaison with MONUC, to prepare by 15 May 2001 for immediate
implementation, prioritised plans for the disarmament, demobilisation,
reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of all armed groups’ identified in the
Lusaka agreement. Whether this will ease DPKO’s operational task, however, is
uncertain.
Nevertheless, a dialogue of sorts has sprung up between the belligerents in the
aftermath of Laurent Kabila’s murder. Ugandan President Museveni confessed that
the threat from the Ugandan rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), no
longer justified the presence of the army in the Congo.26 Similarly there has been
an important evolution of Rwanda’s position on the Interahamwe.
1. Rwanda and the Interahamwe/ex-FAR
Kigali did not cry over Laurent Kabila’s assassination. The Congolese
president’s support for the ex-FAR and Interahamwe, in Rwanda’s view made
him a threat to its national security and therefore an obstacle to peace. The
early fallout from Kabila’s murder however, was not necessarily pleasing to
Rwanda. The late president’s stubborn and erratic behaviour had always
made it easy for Kigali to justify its presence in the DRC.  His unexpected
death, in fact, prevented the RPA from exploiting its late 2000 battlefield
victories at Pweto and in North Kivu. Along with the strategic North Katangan
town, the Rwandans seized an enormous stock of war material and provoked
the flight of thousands of Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), Interahamwe,
and other allied forces into Zambia. Simultaneous Interahamwe efforts to
infiltrate north-western Rwanda collapsed in the face of RPA counterattacks.
At present the Rwandan government reports that it has neutralised the
Interahamwe ‘division’ in Masisi, and heavy fighting is taking place in
Shabunda.27
In retrospect the battle of Pweto was a turning point in Rwandan strategy.
The rout of the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, Interahamwe, and other
FAC allies in the town prompted a debate within the top ranks of the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) regime. Some insisted that the victory should
be exploited to destroy the Interahamwe in Katanga. Some even advocated
pursuing those forces into Zambia, where they had taken refuge. Their case
was reinforced by the reluctance of Zambia to turn over those forces to the
RPA.  Others in Kigali, however, insisted that the diplomatic costs of such an
operation would be too high.28 In the end their view was confirmed by the
                                        
26 ‘Museveni Hints at “Unilateral Withdrawal”’, IRIN, 7 February 2001.
27 ICG Interview, Rwanda Government security officials, Kigali and Goma, 12-13 February 2001;
‘Fighting Raging in Eastern DRC’, PANA, 21 February 2001.
28 ICG Phone Interviews with US officials, Brussels, 18 January 2001, UN officials and Rwanda
officials, New York, 21-22 February 2001.
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cold reception President Kagame received during his trip to Washington in
late January and early February 2001.
Free of the once popular view that Kagame represented a ‘new generation’ of
African leaders or any responsibility for policy during the 1994 genocide, the
new American administration has veered sharply from President Clinton’s
support for Kigali. The Republicans appear to have little patience for
Rwanda’s penchant for military solutions to its security problems. When
Kagame refused to attend the 15 February summit in Lusaka that was
intended to revive the peace process, the Americans responded with an
expression of official disappointment. Rwanda subsequently announced its
satisfaction with the outcome of the Lusaka summit but internationally, the
damage had been done.
In sharp contrast to the reception it gave the Rwandan president,
Washington embraced Joseph Kabila as someone capable of breaking the
Congolese impasse. Kagame realized that his claims to be fighting a bad
government no longer worked and moved quickly to demonstrate his good
faith by meeting with the young Kabila in the U.S. on 1 February and
withdrawing from Pweto later in the month.
These moves were accompanied by a subtle shift in Kigali’s rhetoric
concerning the Interahamwe. In his 7 February presentation to the Security
Council, Kagame estimated their numbers to be 15,000, a dramatic decrease
from previous informal RPF estimates that hovered near 40,000.29 Moreover,
Kagame no longer insists that all of these gunmen need to be brought to
justice. The leaders should be arrested and transferred to the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, he says, but many can be
reintegrated into Rwandan society through the gacaca institutions of
traditional justice or resettled in West Africa. In other words, there seems to
be a greater acceptance by the Rwandan regime of the principle of voluntary
repatriation.  If so, and if the international community provides financial
support, the problem of the Interahamwe can be quickly resolved once
Kinshasa stops backing them.30
Following their presidents’ meeting in Washington, discreet negotiations
between the Rwandan and Congolese governments continued.31  Positive
signals from Kinshasa helped in part to persuade Kagame to pull the RPA out
of Pweto by 28 February. In a letter to the Security Council, the government
of the DRC recognised the security concerns of Rwanda and the need to solve
the Interahamwe/ex-FAR issue32. Since then, however, there has been no
progress. Rwandan, Burundian, and RCD-Goma officials all claim that Joseph
Kabila has continued his father’s clandestine support for the Interahamwe
and other Hutu insurgent movements in the Eastern DRC.33 They speculate
                                        
29 ICG Interviews, RPA Officers, Kigali, Goma, July-August 2000; See also ICG Report N° 26,
Scramble for the Congo, op. cit.
30 ICG Interviews with Rwandan officials, New York, February 2001.
31 ICG Interviews with UN officials, New York, 21 February 2001.
32 Letter from the DRC government to the Security Council, 26 February 2001.
33 ICG Interviews with Rwandan and Burundian Government officials, and western diplomats,
Kigali 10 March 2001; ‘Des combats intenses font rage à l’est de la RDC’, PANA, 19 February
2001.
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that the recent increase in fighting in South Kivu and Burundi means that the
new Congolese president intentionally permitted these forces to escape
Katanga. As evidence, they point to reports that many Interahamwe fighters,
along with senior commander Tharcisse Renzaho, are currently in Burundi.
Rwanda is obviously very worried about this and has re-deployed the units it
withdrew from Pweto between Uvira and Fizi-Baraka in order to block further
infiltration. The RPA has also reinforced its southern border to stop any
attempts to infiltrate into Rwanda.
2. International Support for Disarmament, Demobilisation,
Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRR)?
There appears to be a temporary increase in international energy to confront
the issue of disarmament of the ‘negative forces.’ A plan first circulated by
the U.S. in mid-2000 has survived the presidential transition.34 It envisions
putting pressure on the Lusaka signatories to cease support for these groups,
increasing efforts to apprehend their leaders, while simultaneously providing
the necessary international financial means to fund a UN led voluntary
Disarmament, Demobilisation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRR) effort
in the Eastern Kivus region. Recent improvements in transatlantic co-
ordination on the subject, due in large measure to the increased French and
Belgium involvement in the Congo peace process, also give hope that a
solution is in sight. Finally, the World Bank has become more involved and
has already launched a series of pilot projects in government-controlled
territory.35
This new commitment of the international community to disarmament is long
overdue. The presence of forces like the Interahamwe in the Congo lies at
the heart of the conflict, and no peace will endure while they remain a threat
to Rwanda. Consultations within the region as envisioned in Resolution 1341
are a necessary first step. The international community must nevertheless
prevent the issue from becoming irresponsibly politicised by the belligerents.
In fact contradictions are already becoming evident. For example, the
Burundian rebel Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD), who are
currently being solicited by the Burundian Peace Negotiations Facilitator
Nelson Mandela to enter into direct peace negotiations with the government,
are characterised by the Lusaka Agreement as negative forces. Other groups
so identified in the original cease-fire, such as the Angolan UNITA rebels,
have largely departed the DRC and are not a source of conflict there. Finally,
since the Lusaka Agreement, a dramatic proliferation of Mai-Mai militias has
occurred in the eastern DRC. These groups also need to be disarmed, in spite
of the fact that they are not specifically identified as negative forces in the
cease-fire agreement. These issues are likely to become obstacles to
disarmament if efforts are left to the regional powers.
The competition for leadership of these efforts between regional countries
also threatens progress. The Rwandans stayed away from the 15 February
Lusaka summit because of their displeasure with Zambia's unwillingness to
co-operate with Rwandan demands that they turn over the several thousand
                                        
34 ICG Interview with US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, Nairobi, November 2000, and State
Department officials, Brussels, Washington, January-March 2001.
35 ICG Interview with World Bank official, Africa Department, Washington, 28 February 2000.
From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo
ICG Africa Report N° 27, 16 March 2001                                                                     Page 12
Interahamwe who fled into Zambia after their defeat at Pweto in early
December 2000. They did so with the encouragement of South Africa, which
has been seeking to replace Zambian President Frederick Chiluba as the
regional peacemaker. The ANC said it held talks with the RCD and is planning
to have talks with other Congolese delegations36
To overcome these dangers, the UN will have to take the operational lead on
disarmament. A useful first step would be to create a formal staff assigned to
begin work on courses of action for the eventual UN managed DDRR effort.
Recent fighting in South Kivu makes clear that it will not be easy to disarm
these forces. Ultimately what is needed is a new political and economic vision
for the Congo. This, in turn, will require a high profile mobilisation of
expertise and resources for the country and its region. As testimony to its
commitment to peace in the Great Lakes, the international community must
hasten to launch this effort.
III. THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE: THE GREAT UNKNOWN
Additional problems are certain to surface over the actors’ different interpretations
of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement. Alongside the military questions, peace
depends upon the progress of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. However, the
acceptance of the belligerents to disengage does not mean that they are willing to
move forward with political negotiations for power sharing. The rebels argue that
Lusaka was negotiated and signed as a package and that all its elements are linked.
Therefore, no dialogue can take place without both disengagement and
disarmament of the ‘negative forces’. Kinshasa, however, rejects linkage between
the different dimensions of Lusaka, and demands urgent implementation of the
disengagement plan.37 In its letter to the Security Council of 26 February, the DRC
government reaffirms that dialogue is an strictly internal matter. All parties are in
fact positioning themselves for the looming battle over the modalities of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue.
A. Joseph Kabila’s Uneasy Situation
Laurent Kabila’s murder radically upset the tenuously stalemated war in the Congo.
At the heart of the dramatic changes that followed is the enigmatic character of
Joseph Kabila, the unelected and politically inexperienced new president of the
DRC. Whether an Inter-Congolese Dialogue can move forward depends upon his
willingness, and his freedom, to enter into the discussions.
1. Seducing the West: Kabila’s Search for Legitimacy.
In the face of open doubts about his ability to succeed his father, Joseph
Kabila quickly managed to tip the diplomatic balance in his favour. After an
early meeting with South African President Thabo Mbeki in Kinshasa, Kabila
launched a personal diplomatic offensive in Western capitals. With an
invitation to a U.S. Congressional prayer breakfast extended to his father in
hand, the new president hastened to Washington. There he met Kagame,
                                        
36 "DRC Factional Delegation , ANC Hold Talks", PANA, March 8 2001.
37 “She Okitundu : Aucun lien n’existe entre le retrait des troupes d’agression et la tenue du
dialogue inter-congolais”, Le Potentiel, 17 February 2001.
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who had also been invited. Along the way, Kabila stopped in Paris to meet
Jacques Chirac, who praised him profusely. In the U.S. he also met Secretary
of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and presented
himself to the Security Council. During these meetings, he reiterated his
commitment to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and promised to work with
MONUC to enable the UN observer force’s full deployment. The grateful
international community responded with praise and pledges of humanitarian
support for the Congolese people.
To reinforce his image as a peacemaker, the new president also threw
himself into the Burundi Peace Negotiations (BPN) by meeting with its
facilitator, Nelson Mandela, and attending the 26 February Summit in
Arusha.38 Kabila probably hopes to make a separate peace with Bujumbura,
which he views as the weak link of the invading coalition. The BPN model of
drawn out discussions in which the government holds a position of advantage
also appeals to Kabila as a potential model for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
Kabila’s diplomatic efforts are also  intended to secure financial assistance for
his regime. He needs U.S.$ 8 million monthly to finance the purchase of fuel
and other essential products for maintaining stability in the capital,
Kinshasha.39 Because of the war, its financial mismanagement, and endemic
corruption the Congolese government lacks these funds from its own
resources. The liberalisation of currency controls and the opening of the
diamond market Kabila’s government announced among its first measures in
January 2001 were in part designed to appeal to the multilateral donor
institutions ahead of the new president’s meeting with the President of the
World Bank, IMF officials, and American businessmen.40 The presence of
Leonard She Okitundu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Jean-Claude
Masangu, the Head of the Central Bank, in the government also helped Kabila
make his case. Both men are seen as 'pro-western,' honest and competent, in
stark contrast to many of their colleagues.41 As a result of Kabila’s lobbying,
his economic policies, and his decisions to facilitate humanitarian access
throughout the DRC, some foreign aid will now find its way to Kinshasa.42 The
U.S., for example, announced that it would provide U.S.$ 10 million for
                                        
38 His father had brokered the first direct meeting between President Pierre Buyoya and CNDD-
FDD rebel leader Jean Bosco-Ndayikengurukiye in Libreville shortly before his death on 6
January 2001.
39 ‘Carburant: la situation pourrait se normaliser le week-end avec 250 m3 livrés par jour’, Le
Potentiel, Kinshasa, 23 February 2001.
40 The announcement of the lifting of currency controls alone provoked a temporary 30 per cent
fall of the U.S. dollar rate on the black market. See ‘Les perspectives de libéralisation font
chuter le dollar US”, PANA, 29 January 2001.
41 Masangu, has been tipped to take over as Finance Minister. She Okitundu is the former
Minister for Humanitarian Affairs who replaced Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi as Foreign Affairs
Minister in November 2000. His nomination was thought to have been prompted by the inability
of Ndombasi to carry out his duties as a result of his international indictment by a Belgian court
for his role in the August 1998 massacres of Tutsis in Kinshasa.
42 On 8 February the Minister of Health in Kinshasa gathered all humanitarian agencies present
in the city to announce President Kabila’s to participate in a countrywide humanitarian
assessment, in co-operation with NGOs and the UN, in order to prepare an international for
aide. Most of the government controlled half of the country had been off-limits to aide workers
from 199-2001. See ‘Winds of Change, Kinshasa’, email from OCHA Kinshasa, 9 February 2001.
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humanitarian assistance. Similar talk was heard in EU circles, and a World
Bank mission closely followed Joseph Kabila’s return to Kinshasa.43
2. But There is Trouble in Kinshasa
These positive diplomatic developments are overshadowed by the dangerous
power struggle that has erupted in Kinshasa between the DRC’s Angolan and
Zimbabwean allies.
During the tense interlude that followed Laurent Kabila’s assassination, the
two erstwhile allies’ forces at first worked to maintain stability in the
Congolese capital. Their troops disarmed the Police d’Intervention Rapide
(PIR) and the Forces d’Intervention de la Capitale (FIC) in preparation for the
funeral. Afterwards Angolan and Zimbabwean soldiers guarded important
officials and strategic installations throughout the country.44
Nevertheless, tension sparked by differences over the future course of the
war soon arose between the two allies. Luanda approved of Joseph Kabila’s
conciliatory attitude towards Rwanda and Uganda because it saw little
interest in continuing the war. The primary objective of its intervention has
always been to deny use of the Congo to the insurgent UNITA forces of Jonas
Savimbi. Notwithstanding reports of a rise of guerrilla activity in Angola, this
mission has been largely accomplished. Luanda would no doubt like to see a
weak but stable regime in Kinshasa capable of policing its own frontiers but
does not feel this is worth the expense of a continued large-scale military
presence in the DRC. Therefore, it pushed Kabila to accept implementation of
the Lusaka cease-fire, including the deployment of MONUC and the start of
an Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
Unlike Angola, Zimbabwe did not appreciably moderate its position on the
conflict. National prestige and the personal pride of President Mugabe have
always been at the heart of Zimbabwe’s intervention. The recent disaster at
Pweto in which the ZNDF lost large stocks of military equipment makes it
more difficult for the Harare strongman to accept a pull-out which his
domestic opponents in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) would
paint as a defeat in advance of Zimbabwe’s presidential election. There are
other obstacles to a pull out, such as the fact that many of the troops who
would return home are from the region of Zimbabwe where opposition to
Mugabe has traditionally been strongest. 45 The units are said to be plagued
by a morale sapping mixture of alcoholism, disease, and political discontent.
Finally, fears that the new DRC government would not honour financial
promises to ZANU-PF leaders also blocked any thoughts of a withdrawal.
                                        
43 ‘Michel Annoyed by EU Dithering on Congo’, De Standaard, Brussels, 27 February 2001.
44 ICG Interview, Telephone call to Kinshasa, 28 January 2001.
45 Matebeleland is a stronghold of the internal political opposition to President Mugabe. Telling
indicators of this discontent include court martial proceedings against ZNDF soldiers who
deserted their posts in Pweto to flee to Zambia. Others have reportedly renounced their military
status, and remain in Zambian refugee camps. See United Nations. Security Council. ‘Sixth
Report of the Secretary General on the United nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo’ 12 February 2001.
New footnote: Kadogo is a general term used in Congo to describe soldiers who have been
recruited as children.
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These differences between Angola and Zimbabwe quickly sparked tension in
the Congolese capital.  Harare suspected that behind Angola’s new
moderation was an effort to undermine its financial interests in the Congo. To
fight back, Zimbabwean officials began casting doubt on the official
explanation that kadogo (add footnote below) soldiers alone murdered
Laurent Kabila.  They suggested that there were serious lapses in Kinshasa’s
Angolan dominated internal security hierarchy.
At first Angola appeared to have retained its dominant position in Kinshasa,
largely due to its powerful army and its geographical proximity to the
Congolese capital. This influence seemed assured by the continued presence
of its Mulunda ally, Presidential Aide de Camp Eddy Kapend in the regime’s
inner circle. Meanwhile, reputed hardliners like the Mulubakat Minister for
Home Affairs, Gaëtan Kakudji, appeared to have been sidelined and were
expected to be eased out in a ministerial reshuffle. Kakudji, moreover, who
like Kapend was a cousin to the late president, was perceived as a rival to
Joseph Kabila.
Then, to Luanda’s dismay, the balance of power in Kinshasha lurched towards
Zimbabwe and its Balubakat allies, led by the minister of justice, Mwenze
Kongolo (another cousin of the late president).  On 24 February Kapend46 and
fellow Mulunda, General Yav Nawesh, the commander of the Kinshasa
garrison and brother-in-law to the late president, were secretly arrested for
complicity in the assassination.47 Pierre Victor Mpoyo, the Angolan backed
former Minister of Petroleum and close friend to President Dos Santos, was
rumoured to be in hiding as a result of the investigation. Diplomats
meanwhile reported that Harare was arming the Balubakat elements in the
Kinshasa PIR and the Force d’Autodefense Populaire (FAP).48 But then in early
March, while the new president was attending the pan-African summit in
Libya, the direction of events in Kinshasa again changed when Kongolo was
reportedly put briefly under house arrest.49
Joseph Kabila’s role in these affairs remains murky. The return of 400-600
veterans of the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) from Brazzaville, reportedly
orchestrated by General Denis Kalume, is suspected to mark the beginning of
a military force loyal to the new president.50 The 9 March reshuffle of the top
military commanders also suggests that Kabila is seeking to assert his own
control over the army.  The appointment of new advisers on 14 March
confirm that the Lundas from South Katanga, who have strong links with
Angola, are the losers of the recent reshuffles. The noticeable hardening in
his recent statements, such as the accusation that Rwanda has committed
                                        
46 At the time of writing there were unconfirmed reports that Kapend had  been executed.
47 ‘A Kinshasa, l’homme-clé de la succession Kabila a été arrêté’, Le Monde, Paris, 27 February
2001. Kapend personally executed a bodyguard suspected of the assassination. General Yav
Nawesh was responsible for disarming the troops of Camp Kokolo and Camp Tchatchi, the day
before the assassination. Kongolo’s allies reportedly include the Minister for Home Affairs
Gaëtan Kakudji, the Inspector General of the Police General Celestin Kifwa, the Minister of
Finance Mwana Nanga Mawapanga, and the Governor of Katanga.
48 ICG interview, Western diplomat, Kigali, 5 February 2001.
49 ‘L’heure des règlements de comptes à Kinshasa’, Le Soir, Brussels, 5 March 2001.
50 ‘Sassou largue 600 ex-FAZ à Kinshasa’, Palmarès, Kinshasa, 26 February 2001; ICG
Interview, Western Diplomat, Kigali, 5 March 2001.
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genocide in the Congo, may suggest that he has reached an accommodation
with Harare.51
The New FAC Leadership52
Chef d’état-major des armées
(Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)
Lieutenant Général Sylvestre Lwetcha
The elderly Lwetcha remains at the top of
the FAC. His presence in the office is a
symbol of Kinshasa’s continued support for
the Mai Mai militias
Chef d’état-major au quartier
général
(Assistant Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces)
Brigadier Général Dieudonné Kayembe
Ex-FAZ. Has no known constituency.
Commandant des forces terrestres
(Commander of Land Forces)
Brigadier Général François Olenga
Olenga is a confidant of Joseph Kabila,
who he succeeds in this post. He has no
military training. His nomination likely
represents an attempt to maintain political
control of the army.
Commandant des forces navales
(Commander of Naval Forces)
Major Général Liwanga Hata
Ex-FAZ.
Commandant des forces aériennes
(Commander of Air Forces)
Brigadier Général John Numbi
Numbi replaces Faustin Munene, who had
been a key ally to the Angolans.
Chef d’état-major des forces
terrestres
(Chief of Staff – Land Forces)
Brigadier Général Lukama
Ex-FAZ with a pprofessional military
education, Lukama may be an
improvement for the FAC.
Chef d’état-major des forces navales
(Chief of Staff – Naval Forces)
Colonel Damas Kabulo
Kabulo was the head of the Détection
militaire des activités anti-patrie (DEMIAP)
internal wing. His new appointment is a
clear demotion, which may be due to the
late president’s assassination. It is likely,
moreover, that Joseph Kabila could not
remove Kabulo, who is a Mulabakat
relative.




Ex-FAZ. Professional military education.




Administrateur général de l'agence
nationale de renseignement (ANR)
General Administrator for the
National Intelligence Agency
Kazadi Nyembwe
A confidant to the late president, with
whom he lived in Dar es-Salaam and
Uganda. Former head of Co-Hydro. - Likely
to be Joseph Kabila’s key internal security
man.
                                        
51 Interview with Joseph Kabila, by Colette Braeckman, Le Soir, Brussels, 8 March 2001.
52République Démocratique du Congo. Décrets présidentiels, n° 010/2001, 011/2001, 012/2001,
013/2001, 014/2001 et 15/2001’, 9 March 2001; ICG interview with western diplomats, Kigali,
10 March 2001.
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Conseiller spécial en matière de
sécurité
Special Advisor on Security Matters
Maître Jean Mbuyu Muyongola.
A former advisor to Laurent Kabila, his role
remains unclear, but he has been present
since Joseph Kabila’s rise to power.
Muyongola comes from Bas-Congo, and he
is probably tasked to maintain control of
this important capital region constituency.
Armed forces: The changes at the top of the FAC represent an obvious return
of the FAZ under the leadership of General Denis Kalume, who was said to have
been given that job by the Angolans. The new president is looking for men loyal
to him, and the ex-FAZ are one obvious source. The return of 400-600 ex-FAZ
from Congo-Brazzaville is another indicator of this trend. These changes are not
likely to provide much improvement to the quality of the FAC though. Ex-FAZ are
not known for discipline, courage and efficiency. The new chief of the land forces
has no formal military training, for example. More likely is a continued state of
confusion within the armed forces, caused by ex-FAZ attempts to supplant the
unpopular Angolan and Zimbabwean ‘forces of occupation’. The ex-FAZ also have
outstanding quarrels dating from 1997 with the Balubakat militias and the
Angolan-Lunda gendarmes and  "Katangese Tigers". If these disputes are not
contained, Kinshasa is likely to witness violent armed clashes.
 
Security services: Joseph Kabila is replacing the arrested Georges Leta
Mangasa (former general administrator of the ANR) and Constantin Nono Lutula
(former presidential adviser on security matters) with his own men. Their leader
is Kazadi Nyembwe, the former head of Co-Hydro and a long time associate and
friend of the Kabila Family. The rivalry between the already existing Balubakat
and Balunda factions within the different security services is nevertheless likely to
continue.
Wracked by an internecine power struggle, Kinshasa is in a state of
dangerous confusion. The investigation into Laurent Kabila’s murder, which
was to have been wrapped up by early March, has been extended another
month. An atmosphere of insecurity has crept over the city, prompted by
continuing arrests and revelations that security services mysteriously
executed approximately eleven Lebanese nationals in the aftermath of the
President’s assassination.53
In part this dangerous situation is due to the divide and rule strategies of the
late president. His efforts to prevent rivals from emerging have left the Congo
threatened by the feuds of his lieutenants. It is also due to the destabilising
presence of the self-serving allied forces. The Angolans appear to be trying to
repeat the failed 1996 efforts of the Rwandans to build a Congolese army and
a controllable government. Harare meanwhile is struggling to maintain its grip
on the legendary wealth of the DRC, with which it believes economic recovery
can be fueled in Zimbabwe. A clash between the two armies, as occurred
between Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani, cannot be ruled out.
These ominous developments cast doubt on Joseph Kabila’s freedom to
decide the future of his country. Equally questionable however, is the new
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president’s willingness to permit the political liberalisation required for a
successful Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
3. The Internal Front: Continued Repression
On the internal political front Joseph Kabila has so far followed the path of his
father while concealing this reality behind vague and seductive promises.
There has been no sign of a loosening of the government’s grip over politics
in the spirit of the Lusaka Agreement. In his first address to the nation, the
new president deftly avoided any recognition of the still illegal political
opposition. To the disappointment of many moreover, he did not announce
the abrogation of Presidential Decree 194 of 1997 that restricted the activities
of political parties. Nor did he free any political prisoners. In fact he even
praised the unpopular institutions crafted by his father for controlling
opposition political activities: the Comités de Pouvoir Populaire (Committees
for People’s Power, CPP), the FAP, and the Assemblée Constituante et
Législative –Parlement de Transition (Legislative and Constituent Assembly –
Parliament of Transition, ACL-PT).
Yet, he promised that the dreaded Cour d’Ordre Militaire (Court of Military
Order, COM) was to have its jurisdiction immediately limited to military
matters and invited all political actors and representatives of civil society to
join him in Libreville for the preparatory phases of an eventual Inter-
Congolese Dialogue. ‘Political problems of prime importance must find their
solutions within the framework of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue’, he said. ‘I
call on all the political actors as well as members of the civil society to join
without hesitation the preparative efforts for the success of this dialogue,
namely pursuing efforts to ensure the conclusion of the Libreville process.’ 53
Efforts to broaden the government seem to have been stillborn. In the
current atmosphere of uncertainty, a government reshuffle that would create
an opening for opposition and civil society leaders seems unlikely to occur or
will be at best limited. Several meetings between Kabila and opposition
political parties have been cancelled because of mutual suspicion and
suspected manipulation. In the end, the opposition leaders refused to accept
the president’s conditions. ‘We did not know what the agenda would be or
who would be there’, said one. ‘We would have been there with the people’s
power committees and other groups like that. We are no longer willing to go
to political fairs.’54 The honeymoon optimism surrounding Kabila’s promises to
liberalise politics in the DRC has died.
4. Joseph Kabila on the Dialogue
It would be a surprise if the DRC government had appreciably changed its
views on the discussions. The format for the talks outlined in the Lusaka
ceasefire was expressly designed to unseat the regime of then President
Laurent Kabila by forcing him to negotiate on an equal status with his many
opponents. The same fate awaits his son Joseph and his ‘uncles’ if he enters
into the dialogue. Even if Joseph accepted such a dialogue, it is unlikely that
his father’s allies, on whom he is still dependent, would allow him to proceed.
                                        
53 RTNC TV Kinshasa, in French 1955 GMT, 26 Jan 2001. As monitored by the BBC.
54 ‘Congo’s Kabila Delays Meeting Shunned by Opponents’, Reuters, 1 March 2001.
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Kabila’s acceptance of Masire’s role in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue
nonetheless inspired euphoria among Congo’s well-wishers.  Resolution 1341
in fact ‘welcomed the expressed willingness’ of the DRC authorities ‘to
proceed with the dialogue under the aegis of the neutral Facilitator, Sir
Ketumile Masire.’ The new president however, neglected to inform Masire of
this change in position for another week.55 Kabila, moreover, had previously
told the UN Special Envoy to the DRC that no dialogue could take place prior
to the complete withdrawal of foreign forces. 56
Kabila is not without international support for these positions. Paris in
particular agrees that the reunification of the country must precede any
binding talks. President Chirac spoke of the need for the country's integrity to
be restored and for the Congolese people to enter into a dialogue when they
wished. Likewise Portugal has indicated support for Kinshasa’s views. Belgian
officials emphasise that the laws on political parties must be rewritten,
political prisoners be freed, and the dialogue started if Kabila wants to be
seen as delivering on his promise of a political opening.  However, they also
quietly sympathise with his desire to avoid the regional and ethnic side
effects of political liberalisation.57
Ultimately there appears to be a fundamental contradiction in the
international strategy to support the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Joseph Kabila
enjoys no legitimacy as the president of his country. All sides, including his
enemies, are ostensibly seeking to build up the young leader in order to give
him the necessary confidence and authority to launch the dialogue. But if he
shows himself to be a reasonable - and malleable – leader by accepting
power sharing talks, will the region and world community ultimately still insist
that he leave office?
B. The Rebels’ View of the Dialogue
The rebel movements in control of over half the territory of the Congo uniformly
rejected the selection of Joseph Kabila as president and demanded the immediate
convening of the Inter-Congolese dialogue as provided in the 1999 Lusaka Cease-
fire Agreement. The subsequent pictures of the young president’s reception in
Paris, Washington, New York, and Brussels left them enraged. Instead of being
ostracised by the international community, Joseph Kabila had secured a de facto
recognition as the country’s legitimate president.
The format of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue remains uncertain. Rebel leaders
ostensibly have a common view of the negotiations as well as the shape of a
transitional government, which they formalised in the January 2000 Kyankwanzi
                                        
55 ICG Interview, official from the Office of the Neutral Facilitator, 2 March 2001; ‘Joseph Kabila
bientôt face à la classe politique!’ Kinshasa, 3 March 2001. The document is a Kinshasa
newspaper article from an unknown source posted at www.digitalcongo.net/actualite/01-03-05-
joseph.shtml. Masire is now scheduled to visit Kinshasa between 16 and 19 March 2001. “DR
Congo Mediator Masire to Hold talks With Kabila in Kinshasa’, SAPA, 10 March 2001.
56 IRIN, Great Lakes briefing, 26 January 2001.
57 See Interview with Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel, IRIN, 30 January 2001.
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Accord.58 Nothing, they argue, can be accomplished without working institutions of
government. In particular they want unification of the army under a single
commander. Bemba’s claim to have built the most organised – and best disciplined
– force is viewed by his supporters as a strong argument for him to get the post of
Minister of Defence.59
Rebel unity however, is unlikely to endure once the dialogue has begun. The
dynamics of the talks are certain to feature competition between the armed groups
for support of the unarmed opposition. RCD-Goma is likely to be at an extreme
disadvantage because of its image as a puppet of Rwanda and the numerous
human rights abuses its forces are known to have committed. Less certain will be
the balance of support between Bemba and Kabila, both of whom must overcome
significantly flawed reputations.
1. Bemba and the FLC: A Popular Movement?
Laurent Kabila’s assassination left most Congolese feeling either humiliated or
fearful. Yet in the normally sleepy towns of Equateur Province controlled by
Jean-Pierre Bemba’s rebel Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) the
news sparked enthusiastic celebrations.
Public enthusiasm notwithstanding, the murder caught the MLC off guard.
Bemba was unable to influence events in Kinshasa during the tense days of
transition. He was similarly unable to temper the readiness of the
international community to support Joseph Kabila. He could take solace in the
conditions placed upon the new president, including acceptance of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue, but Kabila’s reception by the leading powers left him
furious.
Nevertheless the rebel movement pledged to refrain from attacking
government forces while diplomatic efforts were underway. This decision was
in part forced upon Bemba since President Museveni of Uganda, who was
embroiled in a tight re-election campaign, had no interest in a new military
initiative.
In addition the rebel leader was distracted by the 16 January merger between
his movement and the RCD-ML60 factions loyal to Mbusa Nyamwisi and Atenyi
Tibasiima to form the Front de Libération du Congo (FLC). As president of this
new movement, Bemba is henceforth responsible for pacifying turbulent Ituri
Pprovince. Attacks by the Balendu population upon UPDF positions in January
give this task greater urgency if the rebel leader hopes to maintain Uganda’s
confidence.61
                                        
58 ICG interviews, MLC officials, Gbadolite DRC, 1-12 February 2001; MLC/RCD/RCD-ML ‘Accord
de Kyankwanzi: Rapport de travail de la commission politique de front commun MLC/RCD/RCD-
ML’, Kabale, Uganda, 21 December 1999.
59 ICG interviews, MLC officials, Gbadolite DRC, 1-12 February 2001.
60 Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie – Mouvement pour la libération.
61 See also Human Rights Watch, “Congo : Massacres dans les regions controlées par
l’Ouganda. Museveni est appelé à discipliner les troupes ougandaises à Bunia”.
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Most importantly however, Bemba held back because his strategy has always
focused on achieving victory in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.62 Since he
launched the MLC in November 1998, Bemba has sought to establish himself
as the sole legitimate actor on the Congolese political stage. He subsequently
devoted himself to the organisation of an army, a territorial administration,
and the beginnings of a mass political party. The merger with RCD-ML has
expanded his territory to encompass a third of the country, with a population
of between fifteen and twenty million.
However, Bemba’s preparations for the dialogue are incomplete. He has not
yet overcome the lingering reputation of being a ‘Mobutist’, who would be
likely to rule in the same manner as the long-time dictator. In addition he
must make real progress in the pacification of Ituri to give credibility to his
claim of being able to to bring peace to the Congo.  Doubts have already
emerged.  His initial efforts  includedcoercive measures to force the
predominantly Lendu militias in the forest to disarm by 15 February or be
hunted down.63 Since the Lendu’s enemies, the Hema, mainly reside in towns
and do not carry weapons openly, Bemba’s strategy risks appearing one
sided.
Other dangers loom for Bemba in the sudden acceleration of diplomatic
activity that accompanied Joseph Kabila’s accession to power in Kinshasa.
MLC leaders suspect that the pre-war ties between Joseph Kabila and his
former Rwandan patrons still exist. They fear that Kigali and possibly even
Kampala will seek to use these ties to negotiate an end to the conflict or a
suspension of hostilities.64 This in turn could lead to an effort to undermine
elements of the Lusaka Cease-fire, like the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, that do
not serve the interests of Kabila or Rwanda. No matter how the situation
evolves, Bemba swears that he will never recognise Kabila as president of the
Congo. Should the nascent dialogue break down, he is intent  on  returning
to war. As if to reinforce this point, MLC forces clashed with the FAC at
Bolomba in southern Equateur in mid-March 2001.
2. RCD-Goma: Backs Against the Wall
RCD leaders claim to be eager for the start of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
On 9 March the movement’s secretary, General Azarias Ruberwa, told
journalists in Belgium that ‘only (a dialogue) would permit the establishment
of who will lead the state during the period of transition’.65 In the RCD’s view
he explained, these talks should last between 45 and 90 days and focus on
building a national army, government, and parliament of transition. This
should be followed by a two or three-year transition period focused on
integrating RCD, FLC, and FAC forces as well as preparing national elections.
Finally, he said, since it was the movement’s revolt that brought about the
dialogue and transitional regime, the RCD should receive the all-important
transitional government presidency.
                                        
62 Interviews with MLC officials, Gbadolite, DRC, 1-2 February 2001.
63 Policy announced in Nyankunde reconciliation meeting, Ituri province DRC, 8 February 2001.
64 ICG interviews, MLC officials, Gbadolite DRC, 1-2 February 2001.
65 ‘Le RCD confirme sa participation au dialogue’, BELGA, 9 March 2001.
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In reality, however, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue holds little promise for
RCD-Goma. Endemic corruption and rampant human rights abuses have left
the movement with no support outside  the Eastern Kasai region, home of its
president, Adolphe Onusumba Yemba. Well aware of their looming political
isolation, RCD-Goma leaders are reaching out for allies. The reluctance of
others to associate too closely with the much-maligned movement, as well as
its own internal divisions, will probably doom these efforts.
Ever since its creation at the war’s outset, RCD-Goma has been an albatross
around Kigali’s neck. Out of patience, Kigali deposed President Emile Illunga
in November 2000 and purged the movement’s top ranks. Since then,
Rwandans claim to be pleased with its performance. They assert that it is
now led by honest and competent professionals, who have met the January
and February payrolls of their 30,000 government workers.66
The movement’s leaders, however, are less sanguine about their prospects
and have begun to fear being sacrificed by Kigali. For example, Kagame
acknowledged before the UN Security Council that the rebel movement was
guilty of human rights abuses in order to argue that Rwanda’s own forces
were free of such practices.67
The movement is similarly concerned by the evolution of the BPN and in
particular the increased ties between Kinshasa and Bujumbura. The Buyoya
regime has been an important ally to the RCD, and its defection would
expose the movement’s southern flank to the FAC and its Burundian and
Rwandan Hutu allies. The Bafulero, Bavira, Babembe, and Babwari
inhabitants of this region, moreover, provide the most militant of the anti-
RCD Mai Mai militias.
Movement leaders realize that they must separate themselves from Rwanda
in order to prepare the ground for a potential alliance with the unarmed
opposition in the upcoming Inter-Congolese Dialogue. They are also intent on
stopping Joseph Kabila from monopolising the diplomatic stage by making the
case for the justice of their cause. Finally, the movement is concerned to limit
the political effects of the upcoming report by the UN expert panel on the
illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, set up by Resolution 1304
from June 2000.
In an effort to forestall these dangers, the movement has attempted to reach
out in new directions in the early months of 2001. Senior leaders have
paraded through Europe and North America, and President Adolphe
Onusumba Yemba intends to do the same in the near future. Internally the
movement has been pushing its support of a federal government structure to
the autonomy-minded leaders of the South Kivu Mai Mai.  It is also talking
with a variety of opposition leaders and figures from the former Mobutu
regime.
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3. Rebel Suspicions of One Another
The desire for a stronger position in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue has also
prompted RCD-Goma to seek a common front with Jean-Pierre Bemba, and
the new Ugandan backed FLC umbrella movement. To date, however, these
efforts have enjoyed no success. A meeting scheduled for 3 March in Goma to
map out a common strategy appears to have been blocked by Uganda.68
The RCD believes that Bemba is at a political disadvantage because he
controls no major Congolese cities. They explain the January clashes near
Banalia as an effort by the MLC to take Kisangani. Bemba in turn sees the
RCD as a political failure and believes it is divided between the Banyamulenge
and the other ethnicities. Distrustful of Rwanda, he would like to fashion an
agreement with the non-Tutsi RCD leaders but would probably insist on being
in charge.
The continued mutual suspicions between the Ugandan and Rwandan rebel
camps prevent deeper co-operation. Uganda supported creation of the FLC in
part to counter Rwanda’s military success at Pweto, which it feared would
convince Kagame to advance on the southern Katangan city of Lubumbashi.
Another source of tensions is Museveni’s suspicion that Rwanda provided
moral and financial support to the campaign of his opponent, Colonel Kiiza
Besigye, in Uganda’s 12 March presidential election.
C. Masire’s Plan
Out of touch with the Kinshasa authorities for nine months, the facilitator’s office
has made little progress in organising the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Once contact
is re-established in full, Masire intends to convene rapidly a preliminary meeting in
which he would present his plans and signatories of the Lusaka cease-fire would
agree on how to move the talks forward. A ‘preparatory meeting’ would follow in
which the signatories would meet with a ‘representative sampling’ of the political
opposition and civil society to agree upon the venue, date, agenda, and procedural
rules for the dialogue itself.69
There appears to be little agreement on the context in which the dialogue would
unfold. In contrast to many of the rebels, who believe a transitional government
should be put in place before the dialogue, Masire sees the talks as ending in the
establishment of a transitional government to run the country until elections can be
held. Consequently, he intends to organise electoral, constitution, humanitarian-
development, and military commissions so that discussions encompass the entire
breadth of Congolese political institutions.
The problem of a Francophone co-facilitator also continues to bedevil the English-
speaking Masire’s office. This demand, originally made by Laurent Kabila after he
had already agreed to the former Botswana president’s appointment, was always a
means either to delay or undermine the equal status format envisaged in the
Lusaka Agreement. The rebels consequently reject the idea of a co-facilitator on
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the grounds that it is unnecessary and not part of the Lusaka Agreement.70 The
suggestion of Gabon’s president, Omar Bongo, as a co-facilitator, supported by the
DRC, the French and the Belgian governments, is also worrisome. Even with a
limited role, President Bongo hardly qualifies as a credible Francophone leader
eager to bring the Congo to a new "democratic political dispensation" considering
his failed mediation efforts in Congo Brazzaville. At present it appears that some in
the Kabila government continue to argue for a francophone co-facilitator and for a
preparatory session in Libreville, Gabon.
In Masire’s view, the appointment of a co-facilitator would require an amendment
to the Lusaka Agreement signed by all the original signatories. No one, in his
opinion, has adequately defined what purpose this individual would serve. To try to
put an end to the problem, Masire has consented to appointing a francophone
assistant to run his Kinshasa office. Whether this will overcome future efforts to
stonewall the talks, however, is doubtful.
A successful dialogue is ultimately critical for bringing peace and a ‘new political
dispensation’ to the Congo. It must at all costs avoid the mistakes of similar efforts
such as the Burundi Peace Negotiations. Masire is correct to limit participation of
the unarmed opposition and civil society to a ‘representative sample’. To do
otherwise would unacceptably delay and then prolong the talks. The key players
are the government, the two armed rebel movements, and the major political
parties (UDPS, MPR, PDSC, FONUS, PALU). The facilitator must press for rapid talks
between these forces on power sharing in a transitional government charged with
leading the nation towards a new democratic future.
With the humanitarian catastrophe worsening every day, and the limited resources
available, there is no time for ‘all inclusive’ deliberations. The Congolese dialogue
must be short, efficient and managed with an iron fist (though in a velvet glove). It
is not the first Congolese national consultation. It can capitalise on the results of
the National Sovereign Conference and even the February 2000 National
Consultation organised by Laurent Kabila. The dialogue has to fulfil two aims. First,
it must liberalise political activity and work out a power-sharing agreement between
the main opposition political parties and the belligerents, supported by their foreign
backers, to establish a government of transition. Second, the same parties must
draft a new constitution together with civil society representatives.
The powers of this government of transition should be limited to the strict minimum
in order to provide urgent relief to the suffering of the population, restart the
economy, and expedite daily administrative affairs. It should organise within one
year national elections under UN supervision and a national referendum on the new
Constitution establishing “a new political dispensation for the Congo”. By the time
of the elections, all foreign troops should have pulled out of the Congo and all
militias should have been disarmed. The Congo has no time left for bickering and
politicking. Its politicians, neighbours and other international friends have to
demonstrate their commitment to peace by supporting unreservedly such an
agenda to foster a rebirth of the central African nation.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Joseph Kabila appears determined to follow a different road from his father. Many
in his father’s former inner circle, however, resent the new president’s apparent
willingness to reform the security services and enter an Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
Whether he has the political acumen to overcome the conflicts that surround him is
doubtful. Until greater stability is achieved, no real dialogue or political relaxation is
likely. It will be important for the international community to emphasise that it
agrees with Belgium’s recommendations that immediate support for Joseph Kabila
depends on liberalisation of political activities, the freeing of political prisoners, and
the free movement of persons for the genuine preparation of the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue. Ketumile Masire’s team must be able to meet civil society and political
party representatives freely in Kinshasa.
As a result, the window of opportunity for peace created by the murder of Laurent
Kabila is closing. Most worrying is the potential for clashes between Zimbabwe and
Angola in Kinshasa itself, where the armies of the two allies are no longer seen as
a benevolent presence. In the east, Rwanda and Uganda are for the moment intent
on achieving a cease-fire. Their complete withdrawal from the Congo, however, is
a different matter. All the belligerents have invested prestige and resourcesin what
has proved to be a disastrous war. None will leave until their individual interests
are catered to. This can only occur within the much-anticipated Inter-Congolese
Dialogue.
The format of those talks is equally important for peace efforts in the Congo. The
task is to help bring about a return of responsible politics to the country and to
give credibility to a transitional regime. This can be best accomplished with a 90-
day dialogue, as envisaged in the Lusaka Cease-fire, between a limited number of
participants. The dialogue should then lead quickly to the establishment of a
genuine government of transition built upon a power-sharing agreement with the
armed and unarmed opposition.  Similarly, the transitional government should be
limited to one year and should only be mandated to organise elections, restart the
economy, and relieve humanitarian suffering.
The Congolese people’s interest in an Inter-Congolese Dialogue is clear. The same
cannot be said for many of the country’s leaders or for the other belligerents. To
protect the sanctity of the dialogue and safeguard it from the predictable efforts to
obstruct its progress must be the mission of all those who desire peace in the
region. The presence of foreign armies, whether ‘invited’ or ‘uninvited’, must end
prior to national elections.
There is likely to be little progress toward withdrawal of foreign forces until serious
work is begun on disengagement and disarmament.  Resolution 1341 and the new
MONUC concept of operations are critical for the former. Peace in the Congo
however, will not come about until the rapacious forces present in the east of the
country are disarmed. Divided and distrustful of one another, the regional powers
cannot accomplish this alone. The international community must accept its
responsibilities to take the lead on this critical issue.
Nairobi/Brussels, 16 March 2001
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APPENDIX A: Abbreviations, Names and Places
Abubakar, Abdulsalami (General) Former ruler of Nigeria who
served as a UN Special Envoy
to meet with Kabila in August
2000.
AFDL Alliance des Forces
Démocratiques pour la
Libération du Congo-Zaire:
Kabila’s rebel group in 1996-
1997.
ALiR Armée de Libération du




Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Ugandan insurgent movement
whose operations out of the
Eastern DRC served as a
justification for Uganda’s
intervention in the war.
Amouri (Colonel) MLC Chief of Staff.
Atenyi, Tibasiima Renegade Second Vice
President of the RCD-ML
Augustin Bizimungu, General Ex-FAR Commander. See
Appendix E.
Bangboka Airport The larger of two Kisangani
airfields fought over by the
RPA and UPDF. One of the
three longest runways in the
country.
Banyamulenge Ethnic Tutsis who have lived in
South Kivu since the 1900’s.
Their rights to Congolese
citizenship are questioned by
many, and their communities
are under assault from rival
ethnic groups.
Banyarwanda A collective name for the
inhabitants of DRC who are of
Rwandan ancestry.
Bemba, Jean-Pierre Leader of the Equateur-based
MLC.
Besigye, Kiiza (Colonel) An early member of the
Ugandan NRM who has
challenged President Museveni
in the upcoming Ugandan
elections.
Bo-Boliko, André A leader of the PDSC.
Bugera, Déogratias North Kivu Tutsi, and founding
member of the RCD.
Bululu, Lunda Former Prime Minister of Zaire,
and founding member of the
RCD.
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Buyoya, Pierre (Major) President of Burundi since his
July 1996 coup d’Etat.
Chiluba, Frederick The President of Zambia, and
broker of the Lusaka Cease-
fire Agreement.
Chissano, Joachim The President of Mozambique.
Comiex DRC company, chaired by
Pierre Victor Mpoyo, involved
in mineral exploitation with
Zimbabwe’s OSLEG.
CPP Committees of Popular Power.
Local bodies elected under the
direction of the Kinshasa
Government.
Dos Santos, Jose Eduardo President of Angola.
Dunia, Lwengamia Mai Mai leader in the Fizi
region of South Kivu.
Appointed a FAC Commander
in September 1999.
Ex-FAR Former Rwandan Armed
Forces which took part in the
1994 genocide.
FAC Forces Armées Congolaises or
Congolese Armed Forces. The
military force of the Kinshasa
Government.
FAZ Forces Armées Zaïroises. The
Mobutu regime’s military.




Forces d’Autodéfense Populaire (FAP) The official name of Dunia’s
Mai Mai militia.
Forces Innovatrices de l’Union et de
Solidarité (FONUS)
DRC opposition party led by
Joseph Olenghankoy.
Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) A largely defunct Uganda rebel
group.
Gécamines The DRC’s state mining
corporation.
Habyarimana, Juvénal Late Hutu President of
Rwanda, whose assassination
marked the start of the 1994
genocide.
Hedi Annabi Assistant UN Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping
Operations.
Hema Eastern DRC-based ethnic
group with powerful land and
business interests.
Holbrooke, Richard US Ambassador to the United
Nations.
Ilunga, Emile (Doctor) Former President of RCD-
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Goma.
Interahamwe Extremist Hutu militia group
that committed the bulk of
Rwanda’s 1994 genocide. Now
known as AliR.
Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye Leader of the Burundian rebel
Hutu FDD movement. At
present is an ally to Kabila
Government.
Jogo Baptista De Matos, General Chief of Staff of the Angolan
armed forces.
Joint Military Commission (JMC) A body composed of two
officers picked from each of
Lusaka’s signatory armies,
appointed to plan and
implement the Cease-fire and
forces’ disengagement with
the help of UN and OAU.
Kabarebe, James (Colonel) RPA Deputy Chief of Staff.
Commander of August 1998
attack on Kitona and Kinshasa
Kabila, Joseph DRC President Laurent-Desiré
Kabila’s son and a top
commander in the FAC. (See
Appendix D).
Kabila, Laurent-Désiré President of the DRC.
Kakudji, Gaetan Kabila’s cousin and DRC
Minister of the Interior.
Kamitatu Massamba, Cleophas A leader of the PDSC who is
currently imprisoned in
Kinshasa. Also the father of
leading MLC member - Olivier
Kamitatu.
Kamitatu, Olivier Jean-Pierre Bemba’s lieutenant
in the MLC.
Kapend, Eddy Aide-de-Camp to DRC
President Kabila.
Karaha, Bizima Chief of RCD-Goma Security.
An ethnic munyamulenge.
Kataliko, Emmanuel The late Catholic Archbishop of
Bukavu. Accused of
encouraging resistance to the
Rwandan presence, he was
barred from the city in early
2000.
Kazembe, Timothy (Brigadier) Zambian officer named as
second Chairman of the JMC.
Kazini, James (Brigadier) UPDF Chief of Staff.
Kibassa Maliba, Frederic Former DRC Minister of Mines.
Leader of the state authorised
wing of the UDPS.
Kibonge, Mulomba (Colonel) MLC Defence Secretary.
Kifwa, Celestin DRC National Police Chief (See
Appendix D).
Kony, Joseph Leader of the rebel Ugandan
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Lords Resistance Army (LRA).
Lendu Eastern Congo ethnic group
that has been embroiled in
bloodletting against the Hema.
Lumumba, Francois Leader of MNC/L party.
Currently resides in Belgium.
Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement Signed by the DRC war
combatants – five foreign
states, Congo’s government
and rebels - in July and August
1999.
Mahachi, Moven Zimbabwe Defence Minister.
Mai Mai Traditional militias found in the
Eastern DRC.
Makoni, Simba Finance Minister of Zimbabwe.
Mamba, Mashako (Doctor) DRC Health Minister.
Mandela, Nelson Former President of South
Africa and current Burundi
Peace Negotiations’ Facilitator.
Masire, Sir Ketumile Former President of Botswana
and OAU appointed Inter-
Congolese Dialogue Neutral
Facilitator.
Mazimpaka, Patrick Rwandan Presidential Envoy to
the Great Lakes.
Mbemba, Theophile Governor of Kinshasa. Once a
key intellectual and strategist
in the UDPS.
Mbia, Albert MLC Secretary of the
Economy.
Mbombo, Catherine Nzuzi Wa Current leader of Mobutu’s
MPR party.
Mchaka Mchaka The name of the ideological
program employed by the
Ugandan National Resistance




Miranda, Joao Bernardo Angolan Foreign Minister.
Mocumbi, Pascoal Prime Minister of Mozambique.
Mongole Combatants A Hutu militia formed in the
early 1990s to defend the
interests of the North Kivu
Banyarwanda.
Monsengwo Pasinya, Laurent (Cardinal) He presided over the
Sovereign National
Conference, would probably be
called upon to contribute to a
Dialogue.
MONUC United Nations Organisation.
Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo created
in August 1999 and authorised
to deploy 5,537 observers and
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DRC opposition party that
originated with Patrice
Lumumba’s MNC party.
Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution
(MPR)
Mobutu’s governing party. Its
current leader is Catherine
Nzuji Wa Mbombo.








MPLA Angolan ruling party.
Mpoyo, Pierre Victor DRC Petroleum Minister.
Muamba, Francois MLC Finance Secretary.
Mugabe, Robert President of Zimbabwe.
Mulumba, Kin Kiey RCD-Goma Official
Spokesman. Was Mobutu’s last
Minister of Information, and is
President of the Brussels
based Le Soft Newspaper.
Museveni, Yoweri President of Uganda.
National Army for the Liberation of
Uganda (NALU)
National Army for the
Liberation of Uganda. A
clandestine and largely
defeated guerrilla force.
National Resistance Movement (NRM) Yoweri Museveni’s political-
military group created in the
bush war in the early 1980s
that became the government
army after he took power.
Nawej, Yav (Brigadier General) Commander of the FAC
Kinshasa Brigade.
Ndombasi, Yerodia Abdoulaye Former DRC Foreign Affairs
Minister. Current Minister for
Education.
Ngoma, Arthur Zahidi Long-time opposition
politician, and leader of the
Force du Futur party. Was a
founding member of the RCD,
but subsequently quit the
movement.
Ntaganda, Bosco A Hema militia leader who is
alleged to have received
support from UPDF officers.
Nyamwisi, Mbusa Former First Vice President of
the RCD-ML and, from
November 2000, self-declared
President.
Nyarugabo, Moise Former RCD-Goma Second
Vice President, and still on of
the Movement’s senior leaders.
Odongo, Jeje (Major General) UPDF Chief of Staff.
Olenghankoy, Joseph Leader of FONUS party.
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Onusumba, Adolphe President of RCD-Goma since
October 2000. Previous to he
served as the movement’s
Foreign Minister.
Oryx Diamonds Zimbabwean-Omani-DRC
mining consortium that failed
to gain a London Stock
Exchange listing in mid-2000.
Osleg (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy) Zimbabwean Army company
engaged in buying diamonds
in the DRC.
Padiri Karendo Bulenda Bunyakiri-based Mai Mai
leader. Appointed a FAC
Commander in September
1999.
Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien
(PDSC)
DRC opposition party that
enjoys considerable support
among intellectuals but has
less nationwide appeal than
the UDPS. Like Tshisekedi, its
leaders and had served in
governments under Mobutu.
Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU) Party formed in 1964 by
Antoine Gizenga, minister in
Lumumba’s government.
Ramm, Colette Official spokeswomen for
Wamba’s faction of RCD-ML.
RCD Rassemblement Congolais
pour la Démocratie or the
Congolese Rally for
Democracy.
RCD Kisangani or ML faction Faction of RCD that followed
Wamba dia Wamba when he
split from the Goma based
RCD in March 1999.
Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) The army of Rwanda.
Originally created as a guerrilla
movement to fight the former
Hutu government between
1990-94.
Saleh, Salim (Major General) President Yoweri Museveni’s
brother and former Minister of
State for Defence.
Saolona, Bemba The father of Jean-Pierre
Bemba, and former Minister
under both Mobutu and Kabila.
Savimbi, Jonas Leader of the Angolan rebel
movement UNITA.
She Okitundu, Léonard DRC Human Rights Minister.
Sikatende, Shabani A Mai Mai leader. Appointed a
FAC Commander in September
1999.
Silwamba, Eric Zambian Presidential Affairs
Minister.
SONANGOL Angolan state oil company.
Involved in DRC oil exploration
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and distribution.
Sovereign National Conference of 1991 DRC’s 18-month constitutional
talks conducted under the
aegis of then President
Mobutu Sese Seko, who later
sabotaged the process.
Tambwe, Alexis A founding member of the
RCD.
Mbeki, Thabo President of the Republic of
South Africa.
Tous pour la Paix et le Développement
(TPD).
North Kivu NGO involved in
the repatriation of Hutu and
Tutsi refugees.
Tshisekedi, Etienne Leader of the UDPS. DRC’s
best-known opposition
politician.
Uganda People’s Defence Forces
(UPDF)
 The army of Uganda.
Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA)
Angolan rebel movement led
by Jonas Savimbi.
Wamala, Katumba (Brigadier) Overall Commander of the
UPDF operations in Congo
after July 2000.
Wamba dia Wamba, Ernest Embattled leader of Bunia
based RCD-ML that broke
away from the main RCD
faction in March 1999.
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) A largely defunct Ugandan
rebel group.
ZANU-PF Zimbabwean ruling party.
Zimbabwean Electricity Supply Authority
(ZESA)
Zimbabwean state power




•  Appendix B: Chronology of the War in the DRC
2 August 1998 Second rebellion in the DRC breaks out.
6 August-1
September 1998
Rebels and Rwandans seize Kitona, and move on Kinshasa.
Zimbabwe and Angola intervene to save Kabila from being
overthrown, and beat back the rebels and their allies from the
capital city. In Kinshasa anti-Tutsi massacres break out.
23 August 1998 Rebels and Rwandans seize Kisangani.
October 1998 Growing international pressure on Rwanda to “admit its role” in
DRC.
27 October 1998 Zambian President Frederick Chiluba mandated to press on with
peace initiative to end the war after consultations between regional
foreign and defense ministers.
November 1998 New rebel group, the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
(MLC), reported in Equateur province. Its leader is Jean-Pierre
Bemba, son of leading businessman Bemba Saolona who was close
to ex-president Mobutu.
6 November 1998 Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame admits Rwandan troops
helping DRC rebels, citing security concerns. Reports say he acceded
to a request by South African President Nelson Mandela to admit
involvement in a bid to advance peace talks.
1 January 1999 RCD claims they killed 400 Hutu rebel militiamen in three days of
fighting at Makobola near Uvira. Missionary news service report that
hundreds of civilians shot and hacked to death.
18 January 1999 Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola agree on cease-
fire at Windhoek meeting. RCD not invited, but promises to examine
text.
22 January 1999 RCD restructures movement. General assembly enlarged from 28 to
147 members, including 22 military personnel. Executive committee
comprises 23 departments, up from eight. Ten-man political council
created to head the movement. General assembly urges better
cohesion between political and military wings.
30 January 1999 Cracks appear in RCD. Non-Tutsi Congolese members query why
Banyamulenge "hold so many posts" in new set-up. Belgian daily Le
Soir describes the new "political mixture" in the RCD as "explosive".
RCD leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba reportedly at odds with his
deputy chairman of the RCD, describing its Members as "petty
puppets".
25 February 1999 UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in DRC, Roberto Garreton,
urges international community to take action against Tutsis detained
in Kinshasa, expressing concern for their safety.
5 March 1999 Missionaries claim 100 people killed in RCD reprisal attack at
Kamituga in South Kivu. RCD denies the allegations.
9 March 1999 Rebels confirm strategic town of Kindu is under their control.
22 March 1999 Southern African Development Community (SADC) reaffirms support
for Kabila, at meeting in Botswana, but expresses concern over
continuing destabilization of the region.
3 April 1999 Kagame vows to keep his troops in DRC as long as Rwanda’s
national security is threatened.
5 April 1999 Tension increases within RCD, as Wamba moves his base from
Goma to Kisangani.  Disagreement between RCD and MLC in
Kisangani also intensifies.
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18 April 1999 Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, and Kabila sign cease-fire
accord in Sirte, Libya, through the mediation of Libyan leader
Colonel Muammaar Gaddafi. Both the RCD and Rwanda refuse to be
bound by the agreement.
20 April 1999 Kabila announces dissolution of ADFL, which swept him to power in
1997, accusing some members of “opportunism” and “self-
enrichment”.
4 May1999 Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, spearheading peace efforts for
the DRC, “agrees to work” with Gaddafi to implement Sirte accord.
Rwanda says it only recognizes the Chiluba peace initiative.
Presidents of Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania meet in Dodoma to
discuss growing rift between Ugandan and Rwandan military
campaigns in DRC.
7 May 1999 Outbreak of a hemorrhagic fever in rebel-held Watsa, possibly due
to Marburg virus. WHO confirms Ebola virus not present. First ever
flight between Kinshasa and rebel-held territory since the conflict
began, lands in Goma bringing medical experts.
11 May 1999 Over 40 killed and 50 wounded in bombing of Goma by Government
and its allies. The aircraft then went on to bomb Uvira, killing two.
15 May 1999 Details of Sirte accord released, in which Kabila reportedly agrees to
“direct talks” with the rebels. He previously resisted all attempts to
meet the RCD.
16 May 1999 Disaffection within the RCD reaches its peak as Wamba ousted, and
Emile Ilunga announced as the new leader. Wamba refuses to step
down, saying he is the victim of a “coup” within the rebel
movement.
17 May1999 Kabila celebrates two years in power with a lackluster ceremony and
“forced parade”.
23 May 1999 Rival RCD factions clash in Kisangani. Rwanda and Uganda deny
reports of a split.
26 May 1999 Chad, which supported Kabila, withdraws troops from Equateur
province “in line with the Sirte agreement”.
29 May 1999 Rwanda declares unilateral cease-fire in DRC.
2 June 1999 Uvira and Bukavu airport bombed by Government forces.
3 June 1999 RCD issues statement explaining that Wamba’s leadership style had
resulted in a "series of crises " within the movement. It announces
new structures, including a Congress, Council and an Executive with
the latter two headed by the same person, DR. Emile Ilunga. The
now-defunct General Assembly decamps to Kisangani in a show of
support for Wamba.
7 June 1999 Journalists confirm that Kabila’s hometown of Manono, in Katanga
province, is under rebel control.
8 June 1999 Rebel factions meet in Uganda, along with Rwanda, Uganda and
Tanzania, to try and iron out differences and form a united front
against Kabila.
10 July 1999 Heads of State of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and
Zimbabwe, and the Minister of Defence of Angola sign an
Agreement for a cessation of hostilities between all belligerent
forces in the DRC. Representatives of the RCD and MLC refuse to
sign.
15 July 1999 RPA forces cross the Sankuru River, capture the East Kasai town of
Lusambo, and advance to with 50 km of Mbuji Mayi. The UN
Secretary General issues report on the United Nations Preliminary
Deployment to the DRC.
1 August 1999 Jean-Pierre Bemba signs the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement.
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7 August 1999 Fighting between the RPA and UPDF first breaks out in the
Northeastern city of Kisangani over an attempt by then Ugandan-
supported RCD dissident, Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, to
hold a political rally.
14 August 1999 Renewed violence breaks out in Kisangani, followed by three days of
clashes in which the two armies battled for the airport, the central
bank and the major road junctions.
17 August 1999 Rwanda and Uganda agreed on a temporary cease-fire. The fighting
had caused approximately 600 casualties.
31 August 1999 50 Representatives of the RCD sign the Lusaka Cease-fire
agreement.
September 1999 Intensification of militia activities in South Kivu.
1 October 1999 RCD Kisangani moves its headquarters to Bunia.
October 1999 DRC Government launches offensive against the MLC in the vicinity
of Mbandaka that lasts till mid December.
11-12 October
1999
First meeting of the JMC occurs in Kampala.
15 October 1999 First meeting of the Political Committee in Lusaka. Expresses
concern about the “slow pace at which the United Nations was
handling the request for the deployment of peacekeepers in the
Democratic Republic of Congo” and calls on it to address the
situation “with the urgency and seriousness it deserves.”
23 - 24 October
1999
The third and final round of polio immunizations carried out in the
DRC.
1 November 1999 Secretary General issues a second report on the United Nations
Preliminary Deployment in the DRC.
November 1999 At mid month 15 Congolese women accused of aiding the Mai-Mai
are allegedly buried alive at Mwenga in South Kivu.
November 1999 FAC and ZNDF forces attempt to advance from Basankusu to relieve
the siege of Ikela. The attempt fails.
3-10 November
1999
Special Envoy of the Secretary General for the peace process in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Moustapha Niasse, visits Kinshasa to
discuss the difficulties experienced by MONUC in positioning liaison
officers at rear military headquarters, as well as the freedom of
movement for the operations of the technical survey team.
30 November 1999 Security Council decides that the personnel authorized under
Resolutions 1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999) should constitute MONUC
until 1 March 2000.
9 December 1999 ADF guerrillas attack Fort Portal Prison in Southwest Uganda.
10 December 1999 Government of the DRC declares a moratorium on Capital
Punishment on the occasion of the 51st Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Nevertheless, the Military Court of
Justice continues to sentence prisoners to death and conduct
executions.
11 December 1999 Kamel Morjane of Tunisia assumes his duties as the UN Secretary
General’s Special Representative in Kinshasa. On the same day he
meets with US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke, who was
on a tour of the sub-region.
14 December 1999 A rebel massacre of 23 women and children alleged to have
occurred near the town of Kalima, North East of Kindu. Victims were
accused of complicity with the Mai Mai.
15 December 1999 OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim, announces the
appointment of former Botswana President, Sir Ketumile Masire, as
‘Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations’.
APPENDIX B
16 December 1999 UN Security Council briefed by Undersecretary General for
Peacekeeping Bernard Miyet. Informed that the detailed Concept of
Operations plan for MONUC is impossible to carry out until the
mission’s observers are guaranteed full security and freedom of
movement. US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, says the
US supports the operation, but wants to “get it right.”
17 December 1999 Government of the DRC frees 156 political prisoners. The majority
are activists of PALU or the UDPS.
22 December 1999 UN Secretary General writes to Chairman and Secretary general of
the OAU to urge the establishment of the JMC as a standing body.
29 December 1999 Government of the DRC accuses rebels of burying 15 women alive in
Kivu province under the suspicion that had ties with the Mai Mai.
January 2000 With his authority as Temporary Chairman to the Security Council,
US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke declares that the
month will be dedicated to Africa. A coordinated attack by
Interahamwe, Mai-Mai and some FAC commanders succeeded in
temporarily seizing Shabunda.
24 January 2000 Security Council Meeting on the Congo Peace Process. Kofi Annan
declares, “The entire sub region has been engulfed in a crisis of
such complexity that it continues to defy our best efforts to resolve
it… The Lusaka Agreement remains the most viable blueprint for
resolving grievances and achieving a comprehensive negotiated
solution.”
25 January 2000 UN Mini-summit in New York on the Congo Peace process.
27 January 2000 Masire presents his preliminary requirements for achieving his
mission as Neutral Facilitator to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue at a
donors meeting in New York. President Kabila declares his
willingness to participate in the dialogue, and meet with Masire.
28 January 2000 An investigation into the Mwenga massacre conducted by the DRC
branch of UNHCR. Investigation lasts till 15 February, and ascertains
that the event did in fact take place.
31 January 2000 Unrest breaks out in Goma and Bukavu, in which the local
population conducts strikes aimed at the RCD authorities until 6
February. These events prompt the RCD-Goma to refuse Archbishop
Kataliko permission to return to his parish in Bukavu.
February 2000 Fighting between the MLC and FAC continues around Mbandaka. At
Ikela, Zimbabwean, Namibian, and Congolese troops relieved the
siege of the city. Also clashes reported in the East between the
Rwandans and rebel forces.
15 February 2000 Holbrooke testifies to the House Committee on International
Relations Subcommittee on Africa: “The time has come for the
parties to realize the full potential of the Lusaka Agreement. And the
time has come for the US to lend its support.”
16 February 2000 US Secretary of Defence meets with current South African President
Thabo Mbeki in Pretoria, and promises to provide logistics support to




Masire visits Kinshasa, where he meets with Kabila, representatives
of civil society, the opposition, and the Secretary General’s Special
Representative.
17 February 2000 US President Bill Clinton addresses the opening of US National
Summit on Africa. About the Lusaka agreement, he says “it is more
than a cease-fire; it is a blueprint for building peace. Best of all, it is
a genuinely African solution to an African problem…. I have told our
congress that America intends to do its part by supporting the next
phase of the UN’s peacekeeping operation in the Congo, which will
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send observers to oversee the implementation of the agreement.”
19 February 2000 Presidential Decree by Kabila on amnesty for political prisoners.
23 February 2000 Signatories of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement meet in Lusaka.
The group reaffirms its support for the agreement, welcomes the
imminent adoption of resolution 1291 (2000) by the Security
Council, and establishes a new implementation calendar for the
Lusaka process starting 1 March 2000.
24 February 2000 Security Council passes Resolution 1291 authorizing the expansion
of MONUC to 5537 military personnel and appropriate civilian staff.
Resolution also authorized a phased deployment of MONUC by the
Secretary General in accordance with specified prerequisite
conditions of security assurances.
March 2000 Banyamulenge inhabitants of the Haut-Plateau area, in the vicinity
of Fizi-Uvira, come under effective siege by the interahamwe and
Mai Mai forces.
12 March 2000 A 13 member ad-hoc commission (Commission ad hoc chargé de
veiller à la stricte application du décret) headed by the Minister of
Justice established to ensure the strict application of the DRC
Presidential decree on amnesty.
12 March 2000 Rwandans and RCD-Goma seize Idumbe as part of an offensive
launched Southwards and Westwards in Kasai province. Offensive
included attacks towards Longa, Lodi, and Bena Leka astride the
Ilebo-Kananga railroad. The Rwandans and RCD Goma also continue
efforts to cut off Kabinda and Mbuji-Mayi.
17 March 2000 Kamel Morjane met with J-P Bemba in Gbadolite, and with President
Ange-Félix Patassé of the Central African Republic.
20-22 march 2000 Masire visits Kinshasa, where he is prevented from traveling in the
interior of the country. He subsequently cuts short his visit.
29 March 2000 Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights situation in the DRC,
Roberto Garreton, submits his sixth report to the Commission on
Human Rights.
4 April 2000 JMC meets in Kampala to discuss a draft plan for the disengagement
of forces from the confrontation line.
7 April 2000 Security Council passes Resolution 54/260 grants commitment
authority for USD 200 million for MONUC in order to permit its
logistical preparations for phase II. Secretary General’s third report
on MONUC predicts that some US$58.7 million will be spent by 30
June 2000.
8 April 2000 Kampala disengagement plan signed by the Political Committee.
10 April 2000 Kabila held a special cabinet meeting and issued statement
reaffirming the government’s support for the inter-Congolese
dialogue.
14 April 2000 A series of explosions devastate Ndjili Airport in Kinshasa.
18 April 2000 Issue of second report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
21 April 2000 As per the Kampala agreement the parties required to provide
MONUC and the JMC with detailed military information, area by
area, for the planning on disengagement.
21 April 2000 Masire briefs the Security Council on the approach he intends to
follow in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
30 April 2000 OAU summit on the DRC convened in Algiers.
5 May 2000 Heavy fighting breaks out between the RPA and UPDF in Kisangani.
4 - 8 May 2000 Security Council mission, led by Holbrooke, visits Kinshasa, Lusaka,
Harare, Kigali, and Kampala.
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9 May 2000 The second outbreak of fighting between the RPA and UPDF in
Kisangani resumes.
12 May 2000 MONUC reinforcements arrive in Kisangani from Kinshasa.
14 May 2000 Presidents Museveni and Kagame meet in Mwanza, Tanzania. The
two reaffirm their willingness to demilitarise Kisangani.
11-21 May Masire travels to Kinshasa where he meets with Kabila. Then he
continues to meet RCD leaders in Goma, RCD-ML leaders in Bunia,
and MLC leaders at Gbadolite.
22 May 2000 RPA and UPDF Chiefs of Staff sign an agreement and calendar for
the demilitarisation of Kisangani.
23 May 2000 Jean-Pierre Bemba assures the Secretary General’s Special
Representative that his forces will halt their forward movement.
Nevertheless, their advance continues.
23- 24 May 2000 Masire returns to Kinshasa, where he meets with the Foreign
Minister instead of Kabila.
25 May 2000 DRC Government announces that they had launched a counter-
attack to stem the MLC’s advance.
28 May 2000 Museveni addresses Parliament on Uganda’s role in the DRC.
29 May 2000 Start of Kisangani demilitarisation.
31 May 2000 Bangboka airport in Kisangani re-opened to civilian flights.
3 June 2000 Kabila and Kagame meet at Eldoret, Kenya. End of demilitarisation
around Bangboka Airport and La Forestière (Zone 1) camp.
5 June 2000 Heavy fighting between RPA and UPDF breaks out in Kisangani.
UPDF crosses Tshopo River, and occupies Northern portion of the
city. Incident is the third outbreak of fighting between the two
countries.
MONUC observer team in Mbandaka requested to convey message
from government of the DRC to Bemba threatening to push back the
MLC forces if they did not withdraw to the positions they occupied at
the time of the Lusaka Agreement.
DRC government officials prevent representatives from civil society
and the unarmed opposition from leaving Kinshasa for Inter-
Congolese Dialogue meeting Cotonou.
7 June 2000 RPA asks MONUC to leave Kisangani because they are not able to
assure their security. MONUC Commander declines.
8 June 2000 A cease-fire is signed by the Ambassadors of Rwanda and Uganda
to the UN, scheduled to go into force at 1600 Kisangani time. Cease-
fire is not observed.
Holbrooke and Annan contact President’s Kagame and Museveni to
urge them to order an immediate cessation of hostilities and a
withdrawal of their respective forces from Kisangani.
The Political Committee meets in Lusaka to discuss preparations for
the meeting with the Security Council in New York on 15 and 16
June.
11 June 2000 Kisangani fighting comes to an end in early morning. MONUC
deploys to Tshopo Bridge between the two armies.
12 June 2000 Third Report of the Secretary General on MONUC.
12 June 2000 Ugandan forces reported to have withdrawn northwards from
Kisangani.
9-14 June 2000 A series of violent demonstrations, involving several hundred people,
takes place outside of MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa. Protests
are intended to criticize the UN’s supposed inaction during the
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fighting in Kisangani. Demonstrations occurred on the 9th, 10th, and
14th.
15 June 2000 Open meeting on the situation in the Congo. Holbrooke states “the
Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement is one of the few things standing
between order in the DRC and its degeneration to war-lord
dominated, resource driven satrapies.”
16 June 2000 UN Security Council passes Resolution 1304 Condemning Rwanda
and Uganda for their actions in Kisangani.
16 June 2000 The UN Security Council approves Resolution 1304 calling upon
Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw from the DRC.
30 June 2000 DRC celebrates its fortieth anniversary since independence.
Promises to inaugurate Constituent Assembly on 1 July.
4 July 2000 OAU mini-summit in Algiers.
19 July 2000 Uganda appoints Brigadier Edward Katumba Walumba as overall
Commander of Operation Safe Haven – the UPDF operation in the
DRC. He replaces UPDF Chief of Staff, Brigadier James Kazini.
24 July 2000 RCD Government of Kisangani replaced because of popular
dissatisfaction in the city.
27 July 2000 Fighting reportedly intensifies at Ikela.
1 August 2000 Interahamwe attack on Ruhengeri Commune in Rwanda.
7 August 2000 SADC summit meeting in Windhoek Namibia. DRC president Kabila
does not attend because he is ‘busy’.
9 August 2000 MLC forces decisively repulse FAC advance northwards along the
Ubangui River near Libenge. The ‘high-tide mark’ of Kabila’s
Equateur Offensive.
9 August 2000 The Rwandan Government announces that it is willing to withdraw
200 km from the current DRC frontlines, rather than the 15 km
called for in the Kampala Disengagement Plan of 8 April 2000.
10 August 2000 RCD-Goma rebel movement announces that it is willing to withdraw
200 km alongside its Rwandan supporters.
14-15 August 2000 All night summit in Lusaka between the warring parties, minus the
rebels, breaks down in acrimony as Kabila maintains his rejection of
Neutral Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile
Masire.
16 August 2000 UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, recommends a one-month
extension of the MONUC mandate.
21 August 2000 Kabila swears in constituent and legislative assembly in
Lumumbashi. He says the body is not a ‘sham’.
22 August 2000 Former Nigerian President, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, arrives in
Kinshasa as the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for the DRC,
and meets with Kabila.
23 August 2000 DRC Government officially ‘suspends’ the Lusaka Agreement, and
then authorizes the deployment of MONUC observers to monitor the
cease-fire. The Security Council extends the MONUC mandate until
October 15.
28 August 2000 A grenade attack at a social gathering in Bukavu leaves seven dead
and 43 injured. The authorities blame forces loyal to the Kabila
government of using terrorist tactics. Bukavu civil society blames
Rwanda and the RCD of the same thing.
11 October 2000 Museveni hosts reconciliation conference between rival RCD-ML
leaders Wamba and Nyamwisi in State House.
28 October 2000 RCD-Goma President Dr. Emile Ilunga resigns from the Movement’s
top post. Is reported to have recognized the ‘mistakes of his
leadership’. His two Vice Presidents, Jean-Pierre Ondekane and
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Moise Nyarugabo, also resign. The new President, Adolph
Onusumba, reshuffles the rebel cabinet.
5 November 2000 Forces loyal to renegade RCD-ML First Vice President Nyamwisi
launch a coup attempt against movement president Wamba dia
Wamba. The attempt fails.
8 November 2000 Talks in Tripoli, Libya, conclude with decision to send an African
peacekeeping force to the DRC. The summit was attended by the
Heads of State of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Mali, as well as
representatives from Angola, the DRC, Namibia and South Africa.
14 November 2000 South African President Thabo Mbeki cancels his trip to Maputo
Mozambique, where he had been scheduled to lead a second round
of discussions on the DRC conflict.
15 November 2000 DRC Government defers the introduction of new rules requiring
import taxes and a number of other government fees to be paid in
foreign currency. The measure had threatened to paralyse the
Congolese economy, cause a shortage of basic goods, and
contribute to inflation.
16 November 2000 Tension in Bunia is reported to be ‘very high’. Nyamwisi orders
Wamba to leave the town within the week. Wamba says that it is
out of the question for him to leave the people of Bunia to this fate.
16 November 2000 Fighting reported in the vicinity of Pepa. RPA and RCD reported to
be advancing on the town.
27 November 2000 South African President Thabo Mbeki convenes a second summit in
Maputo Mozambique, to review progress on the implementation of
the Kampala Disengagement Plan. Summit breaks down in
arguments between the Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda, and the
DRC.
29 November 2000 DRC President Kabila says UN demands for freedom of movement in
the DRC for MONUC amount to a denial of national sovereignty.
29 November 2000 Political Committee overseeing the Lusaka Peace Process meets in
Lusaka and calls on the UN to increase its military presence in the
DRC, to take advantage of the renewed commitment by the parties
to pull back their forces.
30 November 2000 Acting UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Carolyn McAskie, briefs the
Security Council on the situation in the DRC, which she describes as
“one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.”
4 December 2000 An Antonov Transport Aircraft owned by the Great Lakes Company
is hijacked while enroute from Goma to Kindu. Hijackers demand
that the plane be flown to Government controlled territory. The
attempt fails when an RCD Commander on the plane fatally shoots
one of the hijackers in the neck.
4 December 2000 RPA and RCD forces seize Pweto. Tens of thousands civilians
resident in the region flee towards Zambia. Several thousand
Government and allied troops accompany them. DRC Government
calls the retreat a ‘tactical withdrawal’. Zimbabwe Government
explains that their forces had pulled back in order not to violate the
Lusaka Cease-fire.
8 December 2000 The International Court of Justice refuses to order the suspension of
an international arrest warrant issued by Belgium against the former
Foreign Minister of the DRC, Yerodia Abdoulaye Ndombasi, for his
role in the August 1998 massacres of Tutsis in Kinshasa. The DRC
Government had complained that the warrant prevented Yerodia
from traveling, and therefore, from doing his job as Foreign Minister.
The World Court however, ruled that the recent Cabinet reshuffle
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